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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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29 June 1982

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

BRIEFS

CEREMONY MARKS WARSAW PACT ANNIVERSARY--A ceremonial meeting devoted to the 27th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact was held in the M.V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army 13 May. The meeting was attended by generals and officers of the allied armies who work in the joint armed forces staff, representatives of USSR Defense Ministry main and central administrations, and also the army, navy and air force attaches to the Warsaw Pact states' embassies in the Soviet Union. The meeting was opened by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact joint armed forces. A report was delivered by Col Gen M.N. Tereshchenko, first deputy chief of the joint armed forces staff. [Text] [PM191147 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 82 p 3]

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ARMED FORCES

FORMER MILITARY LEGAL OFFICER DISCUSSES VIGILANCE

Need for Vigilance Stressed

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 10, May 81 (signed to press 27 Apr 81) pp 34-35

[Article by Lieutenant General Justice (Retired) B. A. Viktorov: "Vigilance Always!, A Military Legal Officer Speaks"]

[Text] At the request of readers we are beginning the publication of discussions by a military legal officer. We are opening the new series with some notes and observations by Lieutenant General Justice (Retired) B. A. Viktorov. Boris Alekseyevich Viktorov's career took him from military investigating officer to deputy chief military prosecutor. Drawing upon actual cases he describes the work of the Soviet legal organs in defending our country's national interests.

In speaking of the exacerbation of the ideological struggle, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th Party Congress: "Recent events have confirmed time and time again that our class enemies are learning from their own defeats. They are demonstrating greater and greater refinement in the actions they undertake against the socialist countries." These words would fully apply as well to other spheres of the struggle our class enemies are waging against the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth. There are no means or methods the imperialists would disdain to employ to the end of undermining our economic and defensive strength. Pre-eminent among these means is espionage.

In performance of my official duties I had to play a direct investigatory role in the cases of persons charged with conducting espionage against the USSR and to participate in the hearing of these cases in the Military Tribunal or the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. In investigating the circumstances involved in one case after another I saw repeatedly the inestimable assistance in exposing spies rendered by the Soviet people, particularly by members of the Soviet Army.

There were a number of encounters with people who had come to our country with ill intentions but who were then exposed.

They not infrequently pose as members of various delegations, tourists or businessmen. But any exchange of views on questions having to do with science, technology or art, the Moscow subway or the white stone cathedrals of the old Kremlin is what interests

these subjects in fact least of all. "Tourists" like this are on the lookout for any opportunity to "get lost" in the vicinity of a defense-related facility and then, "mis-taking" it for some historic old landmark, record it on film. They find themselves drawn to the outskirts of our towns to collect biased information. Others try to foist antisoviet literature onto our people.

...A young, outwardly congenial young man stands before our frontier guards. He speaks Russian well and is dressed with no pretensions to fashionability. He's driving a blue Volga. There's nothing in it to give the foreigner away. His documents, however, show him to be Mark Kaminskiy, a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of the state of Michigan. And he had been provided his automobile by one of the foreign car rental companies.

"I plan to do some traveling," Kaminskiy declares as he pulls out his entry papers. "I want to become more familiar with the character of your country, your culture and how you live. I'm a Russian language teacher; I teach in a secondary school."

And so the blue Volga set out upon our country's roads. Now behind him were Vyborg, Leningrad, Kalinin.... Kaminskiy had spent two or three days in each of these cities, seeing the sights, snapping photos and making quick, interesting observations in a notebook.

And then Kaminskiy got to Moscow. Here he addressed himself to the Soviet authorities with a request: "Until 1902 my father lived in one of the western regions of Belorussia. In attempt to escape his poverty and find a better life, he emigrated with his family to the U.S. So now he's given me instructions that if I ever make it to the homeland to bring him back at least a handfull of his native soil.... Wouldn't it be possible to change my route so I can fulfill my father's request?"

The authorities understood Kaminskiy's request and granted it. So once again the blue Volga takes to our country's roads. Smolensk, Minsk, Molodechno.... And then at last the village where once upon a time Kaminskiy's father used to live.

Warmly greeted by the kolkhozniks there, the foreigner visited for a while...and then he was on the road again. He had gathered up a handful of earth as a memento and sewed it in a little bag.

So now we come to the last stop of Kaminskiy's trip through the USSR--the town of Uzhgorod. But before crossing the Soviet-Czech border the blue Volga stopped off in a restricted area.... Kaminskiy had a hard time sounding intelligent with his explanation of what had happened: "I wasn't paying attention to the road sign." The thing is, there are a number of signs here warning that this is a restricted area. Even the most distracted driver could not help but notice them. So this put us on the alert. And then at the customs inspection prior to leaving the USSR we found out what kind of "tourist" this was.

In a side pocket of Kaminskiy's jacket customs officials noticed a little bag crammed full of something.

"What's this?" they asked him.

"Oh here, I can show you...."

Then, taking the string the bag was tied with in his teeth, Kaminskiy tries to break it. A little bit longer and the American "tourist" would have been able to expose the film he had inside the bag. But these experienced inspectors knew whom they were dealing with. So they were able to foil this attempt to spoil the film.

They then had to pay a little closer attention to an inspection of the automobile. Out from under the seat they pulled a cellophane package. In it were a variety of plants: a clump of fern with its roots, a branch of spruce and some poplar and birch bark.

"How come you picked these up?" the agricultural plant quarantine inspector asked the "tourist."

"My father's an amateur herbalist," the "collector" replied. "He makes all kinds of medicinal infusions from these plants. So he asked me to gather him some from his native soil."

"Let's throw these away. They've already started to get moldy," the inspector suggests. "You can gather some more of the same plants right here around the check point."

"No," Kaminskiy says, "why here? There aren't any like this around here."

With the cooperation of witnesses this statement was entered in the record. With the cooperation of Kaminskiy the material evidence was placed under seal and delivered together with him to the investigator.

The first thing Kaminskiy asked the KGB investigator was whether the same procedures are used today that were used under Dzerzhinskiy.

"Exactly the same."

The spy's face went white. It turns out that, being a graduate student at the city of Michigan, Russian language teacher Kaminsky had written a short piece on Dzerzhinskiy for his students and had based his work upon the writings of White emigré literature. So it's not hard to imagine how Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy came off here.

It was at this point that I had my first meeting with Kaminskiy. I and the investigator explained to him the course the judicial proceedings would take in his case and the defendant's right to be defended during both the investigation and in court. He can participate in the investigation of material evidence taken from him. I must say frankly that he reacted with suspicion to our explanation. He could not imagine that, even though he was a spy who had been caught with evidence in his possession, we would still treat him like a human being and that the investigation would be conducted in such a way as to protect his right to a defense and with a desire to understand how and why he set out to commit a serious crime against the Soviet state.

We show Kaminskiy the report of the formal expert examination, which has identified traces specifically indicating the nature of production operations in this area. We explain to him that under existing law he has the right to meet with the experts and ask them any questions. But he shows no desire.

The films have been developed. Among the inoffensive ones are a number of photos which were clearly taken in support of espionage. These are photos of transport facilities, military grounds etc.

This instance of the exposure of a spy has not kept other "travelers" from coming to our country.

We have the report of Soviet Army officer Vol'nov. It states: "During movement of military equipment in the area of X, a motor vehicle of foreign make, license number B-HB-999, was observed parked at the side of the road. The driver of this vehicle, a young man, obviously a foreigner, was surreptitiously photographing the passing military equipment. Noticing our approach, the stranger quickly got into his car, and the vehicle rapidly disappeared."

But the spy could find no way to escape detection. He was caught near Kiev by a teacher in one of the schools there, Viktor Vladimirovich Shpakovskiy, with the assistance of military personnel.

The detainee proved to have in his possession a number of pieces of spy paraphernalia. Among them was a special body belt in which he kept his film. His diary contained many entries with encoded figures and marks. Specialists decoded them. As it turned out, the notes were military installations, communication lines and military units; the figures were coordinates and numbers of military vehicles; the other marks indicated trains, factories and plants.

The "tourist" gave the following information about himself: He was Marvin William Makinen [transliterated], born 1939, a native of Chussel [transliterated; Chassell?], Michigan, a citizen of the United States of America and a fourth-year student in the department of physical mathematics of the so-called Free University in West Berlin, where he is studying as part of a student-exchange agreement. He got into spying by a typical route.

"One day another American called me and asked to meet me," Makinen recounted. "It was an insistent request, so I agreed. Two Americans showed up for the meeting. One introduced himself as Jim, the other as Dyer [Dayer]. They told me they worked for the U.S. government military establishment in West Berlin. They invited me to a restaurant and bought me dinner. Here they presented me with their proposal that I make an automobile tour of the Soviet Union, over the course of which I would gather intelligence data. They told me that all expenses involved with the trip would be covered and that a handsome reward awaited me for successful completion of the mission....

Adolph and Hermina Werner [Adel'f and Khermina Verner] are residents of Karlsruhe, West Germany. It would be hard to think of anything against this couple. These two honorable people came to visit us to admire the beauties of the Crimea. Driving their own Volkswagen, the Werners drove through Austria, Hungary and Rumania to the Soviet Union. At Constantza they drove their car onto the Soviet motorship "Litva" and arrived in Yalta by sea. Then began their overland trip through the Crimea and the Ukraine....

But then a few days later the state security authorities received a message. "We, the undersigned," it stated, "unit [chast'] troop command representatives Lieutenant Colonel Petrov, Captain Sitnikov and Privates Kolupayev and Kotlov, with the participation

of Senior Militia Lieutenant Vashchenko, senior inspector of the road supervisor's office, submit this statement to report that during tactical exercises on the Kiev-Khar'kov highway, unknown foreign citizens were taking photographs of military equipment. When they were arrested they produced documents in the name of Werner, husband and wife, citizens of the FRG."

Inspection of the Werners' baggage revealed cryptographic devices and a diary. Between the lines of the routine diary entries experts read such notations as the following: "A radio tower in the...part of the city." "A radar installation in...." "On...I saw a soldier of the armed forces."

Following a thorough investigation, the foreign intelligence spies exposed in all these cases were turned over to the court and underwent the punishment they deserved.

To accomplish their criminal objectives, the agents of imperialist intelligence not infrequently try to exploit those citizens who have yet to be freed of survivals of bourgeois ideology and morals. It would be appropriate at this point to recall the case of O. V. Pen'kovskiy, which in its time was widely covered by our press. Through the businessman Greville Wynne, Pen'kovskiy, a former employee of the USSR State Scientific Research Coordinating Committee, was recruited by English intelligence. This traitor then began to pass information constituting USSR state secrets to the West. Both spies were exposed by Soviet state security authorities and turned over to the court.

The Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court sentenced the traitor to the motherland O. V. Pen'kovskiy to the highest measure of punishment--death by shooting. His appeal for pardon was denied, and the sentence was carried out.

G. M. Wynne, a subject of Great Britain and the accomplice spy in this case, was sentenced to eight years deprivation of freedom, the first three years served in prison, the rest under a strict corrective labor colony regime.

The never-ending plotting of the imperialist secret services reminds the Soviet people of the need to maintain a high level of revolutionary vigilance and to stand as the implacable enemy of gullibility, loose talk and negligence.

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Continuation of Article on Vigilance

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 17, Sep 81 (signed to press 13 Aug 81) pp 26-27

[Lieutenant General (Retired) B. A. Viktorov continues his discussion of the need for vigilance]

[Text] Captain Golovanov and Private Bupalov were the first to leave the training area.

But on the way the unforeseen happened. On a steep incline in the vicinity of a pass their engine unexpectedly died. As he was looking over the motor, Bupalov noticed that the vehicle with its trailer was starting to roll back down the hill. Its brakes could not hold with the excess load.

There was no time to think. Bupalov warned the officer of the danger and then, quickly pulling off his jacket, he jammed it under a wheel. He had temporarily--and

he understood this very clearly--stopped their vehicle from rolling further. But it ultimately proved impossible to slow it down. Bespalov and the officer, who had now jumped out of the cab as well, quickly began to look around for something they could put under the wheels. As a temporary fix they threw Golovanov's coat under a second wheel. Then, with a great deal of effort, they managed to find a few rocks they could use. But as things turned out, they found the problem with the motor and were able to continue on their way.

For the resourcefulness and sharp thinking he demonstrated at this difficult point on their route, Bespalov was granted a short leave.

So now a high-speed train's rushing Fedor to his native Siberian home. It's not difficult to imagine how good he felt, how glad he was. He would soon be seeing his mother, meeting friends and relatives....

Traveling in the car together with Bespalov were other troops as well. A lively conversation was soon under way in his compartment. From the usual subjects of who was headed where, they unconsciously moved on to discuss different experiences they had had in the army. Fedor Bespalov was especially talkative. He told his traveling companions he served in a missile unit and that following a recent big exercise he had been granted a short leave. For what?

"Well, I had to tow a really interesting piece of equipment with my vehicle," Fedor told them, "and I almost had an awful accident with the thing. But everything finally worked out alright.... This thing, you guys, I tell you.... Now getting carried away in his enthusiasm, he was just about to tell them what this "thing" could do.

"Hold it! Hold it!" Senior Sergeant Naumov, who, like Bespalov, was also traveling on a short leave, now cut him off. "You're giving out a military secret!"

"There aren't any strangers around," Fedor declared in an attempt to rationalize what he was saying, "besides, I'm keeping it low."

He wanted now to continue with the story that had been interrupted. But again, this time in a categorical tone of voice, Naumov suggested he stop any discussion of such subjects. Now offended, Bespalov fell silent. When he returned to his unit from leave, Senior Sergeant Naumov reported this incident to his commander. The commander in turn reported it to the military prosecutor.

Honorably enough, Bespalov concealed nothing in telling the military investigator what had happened in the train.... The investigator decided not to make a criminal case of it, but rather to discuss Bespalov's offence at a gathering of unit personnel. Underlining the fact that this soldier had been only a short step away from a violation of Soviet law as well as of the demands imposed by the military oath and that it was only the timely and energetic intervention of comrades which had prevented him from leaking secret information, the investigator reminded them once again that the special services of the capitalist states orient their agents especially in the direction of obtaining the information they need from babblers and braggarts. "The best spies are those who have the patience to be good listeners"--this is what American intelligence teaches its agents.

The spies our state security authorities have exposed have admitted that they have more than once been able to obtain very important information from people who like to boast about how "well informed" they are.

The instructions given secret service agents advise repeatedly that they exploit the moral instability of the people they contact, that they use wine as good bait in fishing for secrets. When he's had some to drink a person becomes especially talkative, a situation ready-made for the enemy.

Talkativeness is dangerous not only in conversation and correspondence. We also know that foreign intelligence services try to listen in on telephone and radio conversations. The American magazine NEWSWEEK has reported that U.S. submarines and ships monitor Soviet radio communications. That's why, the investigator continued, we must maintain the strictest discipline in our conversations and in the modes in which we operate one or another kind of radio equipment or station and not depart from requirements contained in our regulations, instructions or manuals.

People sometimes assume that secrets are kept only in the safes of our headquarters or installations. But that's not true--every member of our armed forces is in possession of a military secret. He would know, for example, the number of a unit, where it is located, the size of its subunits, the specialties of his fellow service members, types and models of weapons and equipment etc. Now a lot of this kind of information would at first glance seem insignificant. But the fact is that correlation of information like this with other information and analysis of large amounts of information make it possible for spies to get their hands on data they are trying so hard to obtain.

Divulging information constituting a military secret, inadvertent though it may be, the investigator explained, amounts to a crime against the state. To underline the danger involved here, he quoted a statement by V. I. Lenin: "In a personal sense," Vladimir Il'ich wrote, "the difference between someone who is a traitor out of weakness and one who is a traitor by design and calculation is very great; but in a political sense there is no such difference, for politics comes down in fact to the real-world fate of millions of people, and this fate does not depend one way or another upon whether millions of workers and poor peasants are betrayed by traitors out of weakness or by traitors out for personal profit." In concluding his talk, the investigator recalled our people's implacability toward a trusting naiveté bordering upon criminality, which has been very graphically described by the poetess V. Tushnova in her poem "Doroga na Klukhor" [The Road to Klukhor]:

*No matter they caught him then,
No matter they shot him....
That's not the point at all.
If once I let the thief in,
It means I'm keeping a poor watch over my own home....*

The methods our enemies use to try to get their hands on our secrets are many. But there is only one way to keep them and that is always and everywhere to remain vigilant and once more vigilant!

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AIR FORCES

LIVING CONDITIONS PROBLEMATIC FOR SERVICEMAN'S FAMILY

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 23 Mar 82) pp 23-24

[Article by ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent Col V. Devin: "The Knights of Red Tape"]

[Text] Some comrades on the district staff did not conceal their bewilderment on learning of the purpose for the correspondent's arrival: Why take a long trip for this? I also sensed a similar reaction in Air Regiment "X" from which the letter had come. Moreover, political worker Officer V. Sorokin announced confidentially after we just had become acquainted:

"An apartment already has been issued to him."

One could guess what was left unsaid: We had traveled such a distance in vain...

Excusing himself, Viktor Vladimirovich hurried to the airfield as flights were beginning. After his departure I thought in embarrassment: Had the editors been hasty? But soon my thoughts were running in another direction. A conversation with WO I. Vasil'yev, the letter's author, served as the impetus. He was sincerely surprised on learning from me that the apartment over which he had fussed had been issued to him. He said in confusion:

"It's the first time I've heard it..."

Later I learned Comrade Sorokin had rather imprecise information. But before that the warrant officer told me of his ordeals.

Vasil'yev began to haunt the thresholds of regimental offices long ago, beginning in September 1976. Not long before that his third son was born. A joyous event in itself, it also brought certain difficulties, because the apartment lacked natural gas and hot water, and the cold water would come with interruptions...

By that time Ivan Nikolayevich Vasil'yev had served 24 years in the Army without a break, and 13 of them in this regiment. He was rather well considered. As a technician he knew his job well and received the qualification of master. Subunit party members elected him secretary of the party organization. In short, Ivan Nikolayevich had the right to count on an attentive attitude toward his request. He asked for an improvement in housing conditions and consideration of the difficulties which had arisen with the appearance of a babe in arms.

We will note that the list of families with many children in the regiment is short. The majority of officer and warrant officer families live in apartments with all the conveniences. It was no accident that the district headquarter emphasized that the post was one of the best from the standpoint of provisions for well-arranged housing.

Much water has gone under the bridge in a little over five years. Vasil'yev's oldest son managed to serve his time in the Navy and his middle son went into the Army. People in the regiment changed. In particular, the housing commission chairman has changed twice. The only things unchanged were the living conditions of Ivan Nikolayevich's family.

No, they didn't refuse him straight out. To the contrary, they expressed their understanding and shared Vasil'yev's concern, but that was in words. In fact, the warrant officer encountered classic red tape which has been ridiculed many times over verbally and in print. A complete bouquet of techniques was employed which allowed dragging out the delay for years, leaving the person one on one with the painful matter.

Nothing seemed simpler from the very beginning than to say with all definiteness: You have no legal grounds for obtaining an apartment with greater municipal conveniences. Don't waste time with idle fussing. Or, in another way: Yes, you are authorized living space with natural gas and hot water as are other warrant officers and officers, but for such-and-such reasons we cannot satisfy your request.

The trouble was that Vasil'yev was not given a "yes" or "no." Instead of this he was sent under various pretexts from chief to chief, forced to rewrite papers, asked to be patient and assured that you will have a good apartment in just a bit. Ivan Nikolayevich rewrote, was patient, and paced the offices... But matters did not shift from dead center. Then Vasil'yev turned to political worker Officer Sorokin, who promised to look into everything personally and give an answer.

After waiting almost a month and not receiving the promised answer, the warrant officer went about writing a letter to the journal. In the letter he asked bitterly: "What is the reason for such an attitude toward me? Who is guilty of red tape?"

It was not simple to find the guilty parties, for those who were at the beginning of this episode are no longer in the regiment. But it makes sense to dwell on the reasons for what is at least a strange attitude toward Vasil'yev...

Officer V. Lupeta "presented" the unique key to unraveling them, possibly without even suspecting it. A discussion of the need for a sensitive, respectful attitude toward subordinates was going on in his presence. Comrade Lupeta remarked with a hint of irritation:

"That's a minor matter."

Probably perceiving what impression his words had produced, he added hastily:

"I mean, it is a minor matter in this case..."

An incomprehensible position, especially for a chief for whom the military regulation has made it an official duty "to combine high exactingness and principle . . . with trust and respect in people and constant concern for them." It goes without saying that indifference toward them and their requests can in no way be justified by any "special" incidents or circumstances.

Here is what struck the eye. The red tape itself was condemned by few in the unit. On the other hand, the comrades did not conceal their dissatisfaction with Vasil'yev having turned to the editors. I was given to understand that everything could have been resolved without outside intervention. I agree, it could have, but they didn't! They actually had brushed aside a person like a pesky fly for more than five years.

I asked Officer Sorokin whether or not he recalled his promise to the warrant officer. Viktor Vladimirovich remembered:

"Yes I promised Vasil'yev to look into it and tell him. I didn't. I made a mistake."

No one is safe from a mistake. Something else is important: the desire to correct one's error as quickly as possible once it has been made. It appears there was no such desire. Sorokin repeatedly met the warrant officer at periodical technical servicing work and on unit grounds following the discussion in the office. And he passed him by...

Vasil'yev's request for help from the journal caused no joy for Viktor Vladimirovich, just as for Comrade Lupeta. Their feelings generally are understandable, but we will emphasize that both officers had it in their power to put a prompt end to WO Vasil'yev's adventures or at least explain intelligibly to Ivan Nikolayevich why his request remained unanswered.

You will ask what is the outcome. Alas, I can't say for certain. I know that minutes of a session of the housing commission appeared in the unit on the day of my arrival at district headquarters (I allow as how the coincidence in dates could be chance). But I would not risk it to call what I was shown minutes.

Later I saw how documents for granting WO Vasil'yev a new apartment were returned: Again something was incomplete in them. It turned out that political worker Comrade Sorokin had been hasty with his initial announcement...

"Why does it happen that it is impossible to resolve some kind of pressing matter on the spot, and one has to write to higher echelons without fail?"

I recall Ivan Nikolayevich asking this when we met. As a matter of fact, why? For most often there are people on the spot who have the necessary rights. It is their duty based on their official position to use their rights for

satisfying the lawful requests and demands of subordinates as well. But some of them perform this duty carelessly.

WO V. Gontsul went up to me in the headquarters of that same regiment:

"I sent a letter to your journal..."

And Vladimir Fedoseyevich told about the difficulties he had encountered in the most unexpected manner. His service was approaching an end. The warrant officer's personal file states: "Called into the Army in September 1951 by the Lisichanskiy Rayon military commissariat of Luganskaya Oblast (now Voroshilov-gradskaya Oblast)." They told Gontsul that he needed a memorandum from the military commissariat indicating the exact date of call-up. The warrant officer traveled to Lisichansk and "dislodged" a memorandum, as he expressed it. It confirmed the year and month of call-up, but the specific date was lacking. This did not suit Capt I. Ushkov of the regimental staff but instead of himself taking up clarifications and explanations, he had the warrant officer turn to ZNAMENOSETS. The officer didn't want to burden himself with queries to the rayon military commissariat or if necessary to the oblast or republic military commissariat, although queries are the prerogative of the unit staff and of Ushkov himself. He was not above shifting his immediate official duty to anyone else with a clear conscience. Following his example, so to speak, WO Gontsul was forced to turn to organizations often with not the slightest to do with this matter.

On returning to Moscow I read the letter of Vladimir Fedoseyevich which had been received by the editors. It contained such expressive lines as: "When I served, everyone needed me, but now there is no end to it. Did I really get into the Army in some amateurish way?"

The editors sent an official paper to the commander of the air regiment. I am sure that necessary steps will be taken and that the end will be found. But it is easy to imagine what nerves such searches cost both WO Gontsul and the authors of other similar letters, of which there are many in the editors' mailbag.

I cannot refrain from mentioning one other instance. Some time back WO V. Pasechnik, who served previously in a small Ukrainian city, was transferred to another post hundreds of kilometers away. There was no entry in his personal file to the effect that Pasechkin had been awarded the rating of "master." The unit from which he arrived did not get around to formalizing his documents properly. The warrant officer sent a letter there but got not a peep in response. Then after receiving his next leave he himself traveled to his previous station and requested WO A. Zhuravlev, who was working in the unit headquarters, to issue the necessary memorandum, but the request remained up in the air.

We phoned the unit. Comrade Zhuravlev came to the phone. "I don't remember that Pasechnik came to me," he assured. "Many come with similar requests. Can one really remember everyone?"

"And so I left with nothing. I only lost five valuable days of leave. All this might not have been, were there a sensitive, responsive person in WO Zhuravlev's place who delved into the needs of his colleagues," Pasechnik concluded in the letter addressed to the journal. What can be the objection here? Of course the warrant officer is correct in his conclusion.

Zhuravlev almost swore in the telephone conversation to send the requisite memorandum immediately and wrote down WO Pasechnik's present address as dictated by us. I would like to believe that the promise will be fulfilled.

There is truly nothing by which to measure the mountains of paper used for unnecessary correspondence through the fault of those who use a Chinese wall to fend off the most commonplace human needs. It is even more difficult to determine the inevitable moral loss from such an attitude toward people. It can be called nothing other than bureaucratic. And we know that a bureaucrat doesn't have to be fed honey, just give him an opportunity to show his power over those dependent on him. Here is where he will display himself and will teach you to respect him by forcing you to come begging to him day in and day out. Such "desktop generals" are capable of confusing the simplest matter so that even an experienced investigator will hit a dead end. They will find thousands of reasons and stipulations and will take refuge behind a mass of all possible circulars to avoid responsibility for the time wasted and justify their own persistent evasion of a resolution of particular problems in the eyes of those around them.

The faces of these knights of the red tape vary: politely sympathetic and attentive, reflecting an allegedly momentary readiness to move mountains to help the person who needs it or, on the other hand, inaccessibly official, one glance at which causes timidity to overcome oneself and the thought to creep into the mind: Is it permissible to disturb such busy comrades? But if we look closer, we will see that these are different masks for one and the same person. His essence is the same with the seeming diversity of the external appearance of the bureaucrat and manner of behaving. His basis is the lack of desire to reckon with people or burden oneself. In my view this is the starting point of any bureaucratic carousel.

From the first days of its existence our Soviet power declared war on bureaucratism. Everyone knows how merciless Vladimir Il'ich Lenin was toward it and how sternly he demanded an accounting of red-tapists at all levels. And even today, sometimes in the most unforeseen situations, if we encounter those who love to contrive all possible far-fetched obstacles to a businesslike resolution of matters, this only attests to the great vitality of a phenomenon alien to us.

Experience indicates that it is difficult to eradicate it, but it must be eradicated, and through common efforts, steadfastly. We are oriented on this by the 26th party congress, from the rostrum of which we again heard the call to conduct an irreconcilable struggle against manifestations of bureaucratism, no matter what seemingly countenance it assumes or in what vestments it is garbed.

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GROUND FORCES

TRAINING IN NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 23 Mar 82) pp 11-12

[Article by ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent Lt Col V. Panov, from GSFG: "Command Training of Sergeants and Petty Officers: Boldness and Precise Calculation"]

[Text] The earth trembled underfoot from a heavy explosion. A puff of bright reddish flame swelled up several hundred meters ahead of the company combat formation and a characteristic mushroom-shaped cloud hung in the air. The "enemy" had delivered a nuclear strike against the attackers in order to stop them. Their losses proved to be substantial: four tank crews, a tank, and a motorized rifle squad. But this did not halt the attackers. Both the tankmen and motorized riflemen had worked various versions of actions in such instances more than once. Composite understrength crews were formed for this purpose and the missing crews of BMP's [infantry fighting vehicles] were formed from the remaining squads. NCO's assumed command of platoons and even of the company, and the subunits again worked as a single, well-oiled mechanism.

This time 3d Platoon commander Gds Lt S. Demchenko headed the company. He made a bold decision: to place BMP driver-mechanics at the controls of several tanks and he ordered the tank driver-mechanics to command these crews. Composite BMP crews also were formed from motorized riflemen of the attached platoon. In one of the vehicles for example squad commander Gds Pvt M. Attsiyev took the controls, his place was taken by rocket launcher man Gds Pvt P. Azizov, and the duties of gunner-operator were performed by machinegunner Gds Pvt K. Shumaniyazov. The other squads were commanded by gunner-operators, and machinegunners fired the BMP weapons. Gds Jr Sgt Kh. Rastamyan assumed command of the platoon. He placed the newly formed crew, consisting of the commander, tank driver-mechanic Gds Pvt M. Zenchenko, and BMP driver-mechanic Gds Pvt S. Osipenko, which came under his control, at the center of the combat formation. He shifted his vehicle to the exposed left flank. He ordered the BMP crew to take a place in the same line as the tanks.

With these very instructions the guards junior sergeant created preconditions for coordinated actions between tankmen and motorized riflemen, and the steel line of combat vehicles picked up speed and again rolled over a range torn up by tracks. The "enemy" rushed toward the line from behind a forest looming on the very horizon. He directed the edge of the counterattack by tanks and infantry at the boundary between platoons, enveloping the company's right flank and leaving his own right flank exposed.

Jr Sgt Rastamyan decided to take advantage of this very thing. With the company commander's approval he himself struck the "enemy's" unprotected flank. The sergeant ordered the BMP crew to launch ATGM's from in place against the tanks directly threatening the platoon. While the motorized riflemen were performing this task the tankmen took up firing positions on a favorable line and used accurate fire to deal substantial losses on the "enemy," diverting considerable forces to themselves. At the guards junior sergeant's command the motorized riflemen dismounted and used submachinegun and machinegun fire to help the tankmen destroy the "enemy" infantry. The "enemy" counterattack failed. The attackers' boldness and precise calculation assured success.

In the exercise critique the senior commander gave high praise to the tactical weapons schooling of personnel, and noted in particular the NCO's ability to act competently and resolutely, control subordinates' fire and display intelligent initiative in combat. Extensive, painstaking work lay behind all this. Its methodology was set firmly long ago. It includes command and instructional methods classes with NCO's, briefings, service conferences, an exchange of experience, and lectures on subjects of military pedagogics and psychology.

What has been stated concerns not only the company in question, but the entire unit as a whole. There is a creative basis to the system of planning. The plan for conducting tactical drill problems, tactical problems, platoon field firings and tactical exercises is drawn up with the calculation of having subunits of different combat arms go into the field simultaneously; i.e., the tankmen work practically all operational training missions with those means of reinforcement which they might receive in actual combat.

This methods prompts commanders to organize coordination not theoretically, as sometimes happens, but practically. By the way, while officers were on ground reconnaissance in the last tactical exercise, Gds Jr Sgt Rastamyan set up a terrain model on which the tankmen and motorized riflemen later ran through the most possible variants of upcoming actions. Every private and NCO had firm knowledge of the reference points, direction of attack, his own mission, the neighbor's mission, what targets the tankmen were to hit and which ones were to be hit by motorized riflemen, and so on. In short, all matters involving coordination were examined in detail. This played a positive role in the practice combat.

It is firmly established in the unit which subunit works together with which other one. In the system of command training for junior commanders group exercises on the terrain usually are held simultaneously with NCO's from among tankmen and motorized riflemen. Here is how one of them went for example.

On the day before the battalion commander and tank company commanders visited the tactical training field where, together with motorized rifle company commander Gds Sr Lt A. Strumenshchikov, they chose suitable terrain sectors and planned the most acceptable variants for working coordination matters. Company first sergeants were instructed here on how to denote the "enemy."

During self-training the NCO's received a tactical assignment and compiled a situation sketch. The company commander gave only the necessary minimum of information on the "enemy." Trainees were to obtain the remaining data in the dynamics of the problem, which already began en route to the training field. Tank NCO's moved to the activity location by company together with squad commanders from attached platoons. They reconnoitered the route, practiced various tactical norms, and learned to control squads, crews and platoons in repulsing an air "enemy" attack, destroying reconnaissance-sabotage teams, and crossing "contaminated" sectors.

On arriving at the training field the tankmen and motorized riflemen dispersed to their places. I will not describe the course of activities in detail, but will note merely that in conclusion the NCO's had to act in the role of platoon commanders as well. In this phase the motorized riflemen and tankmen again worked together. In arranging coordination the tank commanders assigned missions to squad commanders, actually conducted ground reconnaissance, and practiced controlling the attached subunit.

This kind of class is no exception. I have before me a weekly plan for tank gunnery and gunnery practices. An interesting detail is that personnel of subunits working together always practice at the same time, and both day and night. Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks are divided only by the instructor's console. Initially each subunit works under its own plan and at the end questions of platoon and company fire control in various kinds of combat are worked together against a single tactical background. The NCO's often act as commanders of platoons and sometimes of the company.

Quizzes play a large part in training junior commanders. In some companies they are given according to the following format: The commander gives NCO's an assignment to learn, for example, an appropriate section of a field manual, and questions are drawn up in other sections which will have to be answered after a certain time. Gds Capt Zhelnin shows his own way and one that appears to be more effective. Each of his NCO's receives an individual assignment which usually contains first and foremost the lessons which tank commanders did not learn well enough as well as those involving operating tactics of small subunits of other combat arms and their combat capabilities. In arranging to give quizzes the subunit commander tries to prompt the NCO's to expand their military horizons and to be constantly knowledgeable of the latest achievements of military theory and practice both in our own Army and in those of the probable enemy. It is not without interest here to note the following detail. Each day one can see an NCO in the company studying a field manual, regulations and military journals. That means the people have a great attraction for knowledge.

The unit regularly holds NCO days. Junior commanders hear various lectures, familiarize themselves with foremost training methodology in demonstration problems and, in addition, have an opportunity to exchange experience and express their criticism concerning joint actions during field exercises. Without a doubt, further creative exploration invariably will permit the discovery of other effective points in improving the NCO's combat proficiency. There can be no doubt of this as every junior commander and officer in the unit realizes

well that victory is won in modern combat through coordinated efforts of subunits and other combat arms. To ensure that every NCO possesses the art of waging modern combat means to elevate the subunits' field schooling and combat readiness to a qualitatively new level.

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GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNIT MOUNTAIN TACTICAL TRAINING

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 23 Mar 82) pp 14-15

[Article by Col E. Dertkeзов, senior officer of Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate: "Tactical Weapons Training: A Platoon Attacks in the Mountains"]

[Text] The situation did not permit ground reconnaissance of the area of upcoming combat actions, and so motorized rifle platoon commander WO V. Mironov received the mission for the attack from the map and a terrain model. He learned from the mission that the platoon, reinforced by two flamethrower operators, two automatic rocket launcher teams and a team of combat engineers, was to make a concealed night march, for the most part along the Shumnaya River valley, and move to Mt. Kamennaya (see diagram). The platoon was to attack the "enemy" defending the Uzkiy [Narrow] mountain pass from the rear and take the pass at the prescribed time, at a signal from the senior commander, in close coordination with the main body operating from the front.

WO Mironov had performed similar missions more than once. He had become convinced from personal experience that the night as well as mountainous terrain greatly contributes to the achievement of tactical surprise for the capable soldier and trained subunit. Even with intensified artificial illumination at night subunits which make skilled use of the terrain's concealing and protective features, folds in the terrain, and vegetative cover, have an opportunity of penetrating the "enemy" position unnoticed. In addition, the difficult mountain relief hinders the "enemy's" use of night vision devices for observation and conducting aimed fire.

But attacking subunits also encounter a number of difficulties along with the favorable conditions: In view of the limited visibility it is very difficult to orient oneself, maintain a designated direction of movement, conduct reconnaissance of "enemy" weapons and hit them with aimed fire. Night movement in the mountains is considerably more dangerous and difficult than during the day, which has an effect on the rate of advance. Control of subunits and maintaining continuous coordination between them is complicated.

In organizing the attack and in order to make maximum use of the advantages of nighttime the platoon commander took steps to reduce its negative influence to a minimum. Together with squad and team commanders, he studied the attack objective, examined possible variants of "enemy" actions, chose the most



convenient and reliable movement route to the pass and the attack objectives, assigned concrete missions to subordinates, indicated the bearings, and arranged coordination before the onset of darkness.

WO Mironov's attention was drawn to several washouts leading from the south slopes of Mt. Kamennaya to the river. One of them, called Pologaya [Gentle], came up to a serpentine of the road leading to the pass. "It is most convenient to proceed to the objective along it," reflected the platoon commander, "but the washout may be mined. That means the combat engineer team should be placed in the lead BMP [infantry fighting vehicle]."

The attack objective occupied the commander's thoughts most of all. Inasmuch as the defenders' main body was on the reverse slope of the mountain in expectation of an attack from the front, the "enemy" had only a limited number of weapons on the south slope. But this did not mean that it would be easy to destroy them, for under mountain conditions even one machinegun or rocket launcher crew which defends skillfully is capable of inflicting heavy losses

on the attackers. There were several weapon emplacements in the vicinity of the pass, including a tank in an emplacement, recoilless gun and heavy machinegun. Two rocket launcher teams were located somewhat apart. They had the gentle slopes and especially the road to the pass under observation and fire. The "enemy's" calculation was simple: At bends on the difficult route a tank or APC reduces speed and at this moment it is the most convenient time to bring them under fire... Especially in fire concentration sectors chosen while it is still light. "That means we have to anticipate the fire of rocket launchers," decided the warrant officer. "In what way? You won't come up close in a BMP. It is another matter if the 1st Squad headed by Sgt N. D'yachenko is dismounted at the turn in the road and sent to envelop the weapon emplacement. While the platoon column maneuvers along the serpentine it will have time to move to the rear of the rocket launchers and destroy them by surprise."

In order not to complicate platoon control Mironov reduced the distances between vehicles and thus reduced column depth. During the march it was prohibited to use radio communications and commands were passed only by electric signal lights.

It was a stone's throw, as they say, until the beginning of the serpentine when suddenly the platoon commander caught sight of three "enemy" APC's moving from Mt. Gorbataya toward the pass. The warrant officer wanted to fire on the column, but immediately rejected this intention, deciding to take advantage of the convenient moment for better performance of the mission.

"Forward!" he said, giving the prearranged signal, and the platoon column formed up at the rear of the "enemy" column and moved along the steep slope. They covered two turns safely. At the third turn the BMP proceeding behind the lead vehicle slowed down for a few seconds. This was enough for Sgt D'yachenko to dismount the squad. Bending down and stepping on rocks carefully, the motorized riflemen pushed upward over the steep slope to where the rocket launcher teams were lurking. It remained for them to await the prearranged signal...

The experienced platoon commander knew well that surprise fire from all authorized weapons at night in the mountains has a stunning effect on the "enemy." Surprise is assured by concealment. WO Mironov believes that the important point here is to observe the "enemy" with all eyes in order to notice promptly any changes in his behavior, even the slightest ones. For example, the "enemy's" alarm can be detected promptly from a large number of signs: an abrupt change in actions, issuance of commands, rapid movement of individual soldiers, terrain illumination, the firing of signal flares, and the obvious preparation of weapons for opening fire. As a rule, with well arranged duties 10-15 or more seconds go by from the moment danger is detected until the beginning of fire. This is sufficient to anticipate the "enemy" in opening fire and stun him by resolute actions.

Peering fixedly through the night instrument, the platoon commander saw persons on duty at the weapons performing duties calmly behind the stone breastwork. The "enemy" APC's behind which the platoon was moving closely had

succeeded in passing a steep turn in the serpentine. The last turn remained. WO Mironov dismounted the 2d Squad headed by Sgt S. Shchekin on the move, attaching the flamethrower operators and automatic rocket launcher teams to it. Reinforced by the weapons, the squad advanced rapidly on its own axis and made ready for combat.

No more than 300 m remained to the pass. A flare soared into the sky from the "enemy" trench located closest to the road.

"Against the APC's, fire!" the warrant officer passed the first command over the air. The BMP gunner-operators moving in an echelon along the serpentine were keeping the APC's in their sights all the while and opened fire almost simultaneously. All three vehicles were destroyed with the first rounds. This served as a signal for the remaining motorized riflemen. Firing a flare toward the defenders, the platoon commander indicated the direction of actions so as not to illuminate his own combat formation, and immediately radioed the company commander about the beginning of combat for the pass. After closing with the "enemy," the flamethrower operators fired several aimed charges of burning mixture against the concentration of infantry in the trenches. The automatic rocket launcher teams also opened fire. At this time the squads of Sgt Shchekin from the ground and Sgt Grechko from aboard [the BMP] destroyed "enemy" weapons on the flanks in both defensive tiers. The motorized riflemen headed by Sgt D'yachenko acted resolutely and boldly. After bringing the trench under fire from the rear suddenly, they burst into the trench at approximately the center with a rapid dash and a shout of "Hurrah!" and began to exploit success to both sides, making skilled use of fire and grenades and hand-to-hand combat techniques. At the sergeant's command rocket launcher operator Pvt A. Solomatin, who was skillfully hidden in the concealing shadows, closed quickly with the tank in the emplacement and accurately hit it with the first round.

Motorized riflemen fired pointblank from submachineguns and machineguns on the infantry running from the area where the burning mixture flamed.

Meanwhile fighting of the main body which was attacking the pass from the front was simmering on the other side of the mountain.

WO Mironov ordered the platoon to occupy the trenches beaten from the "enemy" for defense in order to prevent his withdrawal by concentrating the main effort along the road.

The pass was taken after a stubborn, dynamic fight. The senior commander gave high praise to the motorized riflemen's tactical weapons schooling, boldness, resolve, initiative and resourcefulness, and noted their ability to conduct night combat actions in the mountains.

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GROUND FORCES


TACTICAL TRAINING PROBLEMS, 4TH SERIES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 23 Mar 82) p 18

["Tactics and Fire-82: Problems of 4th Series and Answers to Problems of 3d Series"]

[Text] Problems of the 4th Series

1. Tank Platoon in Ambush



- KEY:
1. North
 2. Reference Point No ...
 3. Sosnovaya [Pine]
 4. Ignatovka
 5. Dlinnaya [Long]
 6. Berezovaya [Birch]
 7. Verbovka
 8. 1st Motorized Co
 9. Tank platoon


After concentrating forces in the vicinity of Ignatovka, the enemy decided to attack in the direction of Verbovka.

A tank platoon was attached to the motorized rifle company. It was assigned the mission of operating from ambush, inflicting maximum defeat on the enemy and preventing a penetration of tanks along the road leading from Ignatovka to the southwest.

The platoon was assigned a primary zone of fire: on the right the northeast edge of Berezovaya Grove and southeastern outskirts of Ignatovka; on the left the northwest edge of Berezovaya and south edge of Sosnovaya Grove.

Execute: as the tank platoon commander make the decision for taking up an ambush and organizing the fire plan.

2. Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Attack



- KEY:
1. 1st MRC
 2. ... Motorized Rifle Platoon [MRP]
 3. ... Squad
 4. North
 5. Redkiy [Sparse] Bushes
 6. Podkova [Horseshoe] Hill
 7. Dlinnaya [Long] Hill
 8. Temnyy [Dark] Forest


After penetrating the enemy forward edge of defense, the 3d MRP, 1st MRC, is fighting in the depth. The 1st MRP is attacking to its right and the 2d MRP, 2d MRC, on the left.

At 1235 hours the platoon was subjected to fire pressure as it moved toward Dlinnaya Hill and encountered stubborn enemy resistance.

ATGM fire destroyed a BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] of 2d Squad and enemy mortar fire placed 3d Squad out of action.

Execute: Make the decision based on the situation and assign combat missions to subordinates.

3. Reconnaissance Platoon in an Ambush



- KEY:
1. Dubrava [Oak] Forest
 2. Figurnaya Grove
 3. ORD [separate reconnaissance patrol] No 1
 4. Patrol vehicle
 5. Svetlaya [Bright] River
 6. Kamennyy [Stone] Quarry
 7. North
 8. Yuzhnyy [South] Forest
 9. Pestrovo


ORD No 1 consisting of three BMP's and one tank was performing reconnaissance in the direction of Dubrava Forest and Pestrovo and reached the southern edge of Dubrava Forest, where the

separate reconnaissance patrol commander received a report from the patrol vehicle commander about movement of a lone enemy APC in the direction of Pestrovo and Benchmark 151.6.

Execute: Make the decision as the commander of ORD No 1. Show the decision on a diagram.

Answers to Problems of 3d Series

1. Tank Platoon in the Attack




KEY:

1. 3d Tank Platoon
2. Berezovaya [Birch] Grove
3. Kruglaya [Round] Grove

Decision: Remove platoon from attack by ATGM fire. Report to battalion commander about ATGM's detected on Hill 220.5. Using the hollow, move the platoon to the western edge of Berezovaya Grove, destroy the ATGM's by fire from in place and continue to perform the assigned mission.

Substantiation: The platoon has to be taken under cover behind Hill 215.0, otherwise it will be destroyed by ATGM fire. The hollow is a natural cover for platoon maneuver to the edge of Berezovaya Forest for taking up a firing position and conducting fire from in place at flat-trajectory range.

2. Motorized Rifle Squad in Battle Outposts



KEY:

1. 1st MRP
2. ... Motorized Rifle Squad
3. Ref pt No ...
4. SO [fire concentration]
5. Ruins
6. North
7. Barn


Decision: Destroy the tank by fire from the BMP gun, destroy the APC by fire from the rocket launcher and hit the advancing infantry by concentrated squad fire.

Report the advance of enemy infantry to the platoon commander.

Commands:

- Gunner-operator, against tank, Reference Point 3, down 100, destroy.
- Rocket launcher operator, Reference Point 2, down 200, APC, destroy.
- Squad, against advancing infantry, quadrant elevation 4, fire!

3. Tank on Patrol



KEY:

1. 2d Tank Platoon (GPZ [advance party] from 1st Tank Bn)
2. Patrol tank from GPZ
3. North

Decision: On detecting the enemy immediately report to the platoon commander: "Yastreb-1," this is "Yastreb-2." Tank in emplacement in vicinity of Hill 356.0, ATGM on APC near Hill 350.7, infantry squad in trench down 50. Request permission: Using Hill 375.7, to move to the northwestern edge of grove, and from there destroy ATGM and tank in emplacement. This is "Yastreb-2," over.

Commands:

--Gunner, fragmentation, straight ahead Hill 350.7, ATGM, 800, from in place, fire!

--Gunner, armor-piercing, straight ahead, Nameless Hill, to the left 20, tank in emplacement, 700, from in place, fire!

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GROUND FORCES

NEED FOR MORE SPECIFIC PARTY WORK IN ARMY NOTED

PM131535 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Arapov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, carried under rubric "Toward the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries": "Firmly Pursue the Party Line"]

[Text] About a year ago in the motorized rifle regiment the results of combat training worsened. The District Staff and Political Directorate decided to set up a comprehensive group and to make a detailed investigation of the reasons on the spot.

The check made it possible to reveal that in the unit people were often diverted from combat training, that certain officers prepared poorly for the classes and that educational work had been slackened, and this was of course mentioned at the investigation held in the unit on the basis of the results of the check. Nonetheless, to stop at that was to fail to mention the most essential point. Because the question arose: Why were people "diverted," why did officers "prepare poorly," why had work been "slackened?"....

The point was (and this was the root of the problem) that in the workstyle of certain leaders who were Communist Party members there had been a clear violation of the unity of practical and businesslike efficiency with an aspiration toward great goals--unity the need for which was mentioned at the 26th CPSU Congress--and narrowly departmental interests and instant advantages in many respects had pushed the main thing into the background. People had grown familiar with and accustomed to petty shortcomings, and these had gradually developed into major gaps and omissions. In other words, people in the regiment had ceased to be really demanding and really exacting. That applied to the commander, the staff and the party committee, headed by Capt P. Kotvitskiy. The work of the party committee was characterized by slackness and formalism, and there was not enough party purposefulness or true party militancy.

The section of the CPSU rules regarding the duties of the party member contains the following words: "...firmly and unswervingly implement the party's decisions...." The 26th CPSU Congress said to primary party organizations: "Firmly pursue the party line." In other words, principledness in fulfilling the party's decisions and persistence in implementing its policy in the allocated sector must run right through everything and be the linchpin in the work of the party committee, the entire party organization and every communist.

But does that idea always permeate the actions of every communist and every party collective? Does it always raise people above everyday matters, above commonplace secondary concerns and affairs, above subjective feelings and superficial hasty decisions? Unfortunately that is not always the case. It is not surprising that some party organization secretaries or, as the saying goes, rank-and-file communists get flustered as soon as you ask: How specifically can you confirm your firmness in fulfilling the party's decisions and in pursuing the party line?

I cannot help recalling now the well-known words of V.I. Lenin: "In order to be a real party member it is not enough to call yourself that, it is not enough to carry out propaganda 'in the spirit' of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party Program." He emphasized, discussing the nature of activity to implement the partywide tasks, "You also have to carry out all your practical activity in accordance with the party's tactical decisions. ...the party member is the person who really conducts the party's tactical line...."

To really conduct the party's tactical line.... Today what that means for everyone is consistently and persistently implementing in everyday practice the demands arising for us from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the resolutions of the party Central Committee. The most specific demands can be made here. For instance, today the party has adopted a course of intensifying labor in all spheres of social production. For army party organizations this means facing up to the problems of intensifying the training process, taking an active part in improving methods of tuition and the training material base, raising the propaganda of advanced experience to new heights, improving the organization of socialist competition, and so forth.

Or take the task of improving ideological education work. Here too, in principle, the road for us is clear. Then there is the party's slogan "The economy must be economical...." The demands it makes of the leadership style, of questions of intraparty life, of communists' political activeness.... The issues are very specific. But, unfortunately, certain party organizations have failed to realize that you need to think out a long-term program of work in each of the focal directions. You ask some secretaries: What have you done to improve ideological work? They reply: "We've discussed it at meetings, we heard a report from comrade such-and-such in the party committee...."

[PM131537] I want to cite a different kind of example. The ability to translate the tasks set by the 26th CPSU Congress into the language of its own practice is what characterizes the party organization headed by Maj V. Fedoseyev. Take the problem of improving ideological education activity. The organization has thought about how and in what directions to improve it. Acute, self-critical, specific discussion at party meetings, agitation and propaganda group sessions, seminars with political study leaders and scientific and practical conferences have armed people with the new requirements of their educational work. It is clear when any lecture is to be formulated, when it is to be discussed, when any questions of methodological skill are to be studied with the members of the agitation and propaganda group, political study leaders and agitation workers. It is clear when, by whom and according to what criteria (they become increasingly complex as propagandists ascend the rungs of methodological studies) the quality of classes and agitation and propaganda events is to be checked.

There, they are beginning to introduce vigorously into propagandists' practice elements of the problem-centered method of tuition and they hope that in a year's time it will be clearly expressed in the working methods of the majority of officers. There are plans for consistent measures to restructure the activity of the methodological room [metodicheskiy kabinet], change the face of visual agitation, make wider use of technical means of propaganda....

Overall, party work in the unit has improved markedly and has been enriched and its influence on the resolution of the tasks of strengthening troop discipline and improving combat readiness has increased.

For army party organizations and for every communist, to firmly implement the party line is above all, to work persistently and selflessly to strengthen the armed forces' combat might and the country's defense capability. The responsibility entrusted to the serviceman for the safeguarding of peaceful conditions for the building of communism is very great. Everyone who stands today in the combat formation with weapon in hand must feel that with all his heart. That applies especially to communists.

But why then are there cases of indulgence at combat training classes, of glossing over of shortcomings and of embellishment of the true state of affairs? Why are cases of the unjustified diversion of people from training still encountered? There can only be one answer and in such cases we must say with the utmost forthrightness: That there is a loss of keen political sense and a kind of blunted awareness of the kind of times we are living in, the kind of danger that constantly hangs over the planet, and the extent of your personal responsibility, communist, your personal responsibility, party organization, for ensuring the reliable defense of socialism's gains.

It is a most important duty of party organizations to explain to people their role, their part and their responsibility. The party committee and party bureau above all must be filled with those feelings and that responsibility.

Indeed, when this happened with the members of the unit party committee mentioned at the beginning of the article, things started to go better and people began to live in another dimension, as it were. The party organization's everyday concerns merged organically with the resolution of partywide tasks.

I will cite the following illustration. The quality of combat training and the level of troop discipline had declined in one battalion. Relapses of the old "disease"--the diversion of people from training and a failure to consider questions of education--were also making themselves felt. It was decided to invite Battalion Commander Capt V. Kalyuzhnyy, his Deputy for Political Affairs Maj I. Tolchenov and Party Organization Secretary Capt R. Asmodyarov to a session of the party committee. Before the communists were heard out there was a profound analysis regarding questions that had been previously thought through. The discussion at the party committee was pointed. Characteristically, the activity of the battalion's leading communists and party organization was examined from the viewpoint of the implementation of the specific demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the USSR defense minister. How was one-man command being strengthened on a party basis? Were leadership methods and the workstyle being improved in the spirit of the party congress,

how was this being done and what was missing? To what extent did the party organization display initiative, activeness and principledness? What specifically had been done to improve servicemen's political education in the spirit of the party's directives?

It was in this comparison of today's demands and the actual situation that the discussion proceeded and the analysis was made; it was from this lofty standpoint that the cases of indulgence in the organization of training, connivance and a lack of consideration toward people, their needs and their spiritual demands were now assessed.

[PM131539] From the platform of the 26th CPSU Congress Comrade L.I. Brezhnev expressed the wish that all party organizations display firmness in implementing the party's decisions and unswervingly following the spirit of its demands. I would like to reiterate that this is expressed very specifically in life. If, for instance, a training session in a subunit has been held not in the field, as planned, but in the classroom, the party organ has no right to remain silent. If simplifications are allowed to occur in a nighttime exercise or if a commander-communist has begun to display a purely formal attitude toward the physical training of personnel, the party committee or party bureau must not remain aloof. It is necessary not only to discuss the individual cases of negligence and carelessness but also to take a broader and deeper view and to discuss the absence of a system of reciprocal party exactingness and the damage caused to the unit's combat readiness.

"It has long been well known that party slogans and programs live in the activity of the masses," the party congress emphasized. Concern to ensure that the 26th CPSU Congress directives live in bright deeds in every troop collective is the primary duty of party leaders, every communist and all party organizations.

CSO: 1801/242

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MANUAL TRACKING TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 10 Mar 82)
pp 6-7

[Article by Lt Col V. Sinyutin, Order of Lenin Moscow ADD: "The Army and Navy Today: Defenders of the Air Borders: Air Defense Forces Celebrate Their Holiday in April"]

[Text] Personnel of the Air Defense Forces, which celebrate their annual holiday in April, are performing their patriotic duty in the common combat formation of USSR Armed Forces personnel. In implementing resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the missilemen, aviators and radar operators are persistently mastering sophisticated equipment and the skills of its combat employment, and are learning to hit air attack weapons at maximum range and with the first launch.

A feature of service in the Air Defense Forces is that they perform a mission of state importance in peacetime--they perform operational readiness duty and reliably safeguard the creative labor of the Soviet people. To be in constant combat readiness is the main tradition of the Air Defense Forces, which were created and indoctrinated by the Communist Party.

An article from a foremost surface-to-air missile [SAM] battalion tells about how today's defenders of the Motherland's sky are perfecting combat proficiency in heading for the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation and how the good training they received in DOSAAF schools helped them become outstanding soldiers.

A blip reflected from an aircraft could easily be seen a second ago on the screen. Suddenly it disappeared. Where did the target go? What must be done to reacquire it? The questions ran through his head with lightninglike speed.

Sr Sgt E. Rudin intensively sought the solution. A year ago it was easy to become confused in such a situation. But now the manual tracking (RS) operator already had abundant experience. Having been called into the Army after completing a radiotechnical tekhnikum in the city of Riga, he had mastered the

sophisticated equipment well and acquired firm skills in controlling it, and so he functioned quietly and with composure. After reporting what happened to Capt K. Shevchenko he flipped one toggle and then another with a trained movement in the semidarkness of the hut. Then a luminous spot appeared in the emerald green of the scope. It was the target!

Modern combat demands great endurance and skill of a missileman, for if a blip suddenly disappears it has to be found immediately. But how? For this the operators have to evaluate the air situation in compressed periods of time, divine the enemy's strategem and take countermeasures. This requires proficiency of the highest sort.

Sr Sgt Rudin loves instants where one must solve a problem with many unknowns and act quickly and surely. The RS operators and missile guidance officer are at the point of the attack and crown the work of the entire subunit. If one has fussed or there is one uncertain action, a break in tracking is inevitable. If the "enemy" penetrates to the defended installation the assigned mission will not be accomplished.

Rudin leaned backward just a bit and glanced at Pvt A. Gabriyelyan. "There's a person who smiles even in the most intense situation," the senior sergeant thought warmly about his subordinate. Gabriyelyan, a battalion favorite, can talk for hours about his native Baku and its sights. Everyone in the subunit is his friend and comrade and he finds both a friendly word and good parting words for everyone.

...Not much time had gone by since the beginning of the tactical exercise, but the "enemy" did not force them to wait for him--his aircraft had appeared somewhere in the sky. The reflected radio signal was being held firmly on the displays. Rudin thought proudly about his missile system. It would seem that detecting an aircraft in space at a long range was just as impossible a task as finding a needle in a haystack. But equipment copes successfully with what is beyond a person's capability. The powerful radar equipment "finds" the necessary signal, "winnows" out the interference and sends a precise luminous blip to the screen. Any maneuver of the air target can be determined instantaneously from its behavior.

That is how everything might be in the ideal case, but the "enemy" sends out radio interference, from which all screens turn from greenish to milky. Try to determine where the target is. Or he will begin to "toss" such signals around, which at times makes it very difficult to distinguish them from the real blip. In such cases both tactical skill and the ability to "squeeze" everything out of the equipment of which it is capable are tested.

"Attention, launch!" comes, as always in such cases, the triumphant voice of Capt K. Shevchenko, master of combat qualification.

Rudin sensed the strained breathing of Pvt Yu. Kurkin to the right as he was positioned at the screen with proprietary thoroughness. Yuriy was the opposite of Gabriyelyan. If you didn't talk to him he would be silent the whole day. It was difficult with him at first. After a class it was impossible to

know whether he had assimilated the topic or had understood nothing. The fact is that in mastering sophisticated equipment a neutral position is dangerous. It is not a case where silence is golden.

Gabriyelyan would become indignant and scold his comrade. He himself would succeed by determination and assertiveness. During self-training he would be dying to explain the operation of difficult circuits and would also draw Yuriy into the discussion. He would test him by right of a countryman--they completed the DOSAAF Baku Radiotechnical School together. Kurkin sometimes would grumble, but would listen and answer the questions. The knowledge of radio equipment gained before the Army allowed them to "grasp" the features of operation of the missile guidance radar units and assemblies faster than others. They passed the test for third class simultaneously, then for second and first class, and became outstanding. Now they are the best RS operators in the unit.

...Capt Shevchenko shifted the antennas into a new position as soon as the special electronic signals simulating the flight of missiles coincided with the signal reflected from the aircraft. The target had been destroyed conditionally.

Sr Sgt Rudin again peered into the screen until his eyes hurt. Gabriyelyan and Kurkin leaned a bit forward, on guard, as if preparing to jump. A bright blip suddenly appeared on the edge of the scope. Rudin began to work by habit, but then stopped.

He was troubled by the fact that the signal was extremely clear. At such a range a blip from a real aircraft would be diffuse and pale.

Shevchenko, Gabriyelyan and Kurkin were solving a similar problem. Without conversing they arrived at the same conclusion--a false signal. Soon the guess was confirmed. When the antenna tilt angle was increased an entire chain of similar blips appeared at once on the scopes. They formed an amusing chain, descending along the diagonal on the operator's scope at which Rudin was working.

"Look, a garland on the screen," whispered the restless Gabriyelyan. "It's the first time I've seen that. My blips have formed into a column like soldiers and are moving from top to bottom one after the other."

"Later, Artur. Look for the aircraft."

Rudin realized that his words were superfluous, that Gabriyelyan had not relaxed vigilance for a second.

"I have a target!" reported Kurkin.

"Take under RS!" ordered Capt Shevchenko.

In a fraction of a second they had acquired this blip for tracking. Rudin soon was convinced that according to the range the speed the blip was moving was low, and could not be such for a real aircraft.

"False target," he reported.

Capt Shevchenko immediately stopped tracking it. The launcher control officer clarified the coordinates of the aircraft given him from the surveillance and acquisition radar. Again there was a search. The blips are just asking to be placed in the crosshairs, one more handsomely than the other, as if they are drawing the operators' attention by a magnet, but the missilemen "winnow" them out one after the other.

Then a new blip flashed and immediately merged with the interference. Soon a weak signal separated from the bright spot. Doubts were dispelled--it was an aircraft. It was reported immediately to the missile guidance officer.

It was destroyed conditionally at maximum range. Then the missilemen were awaited by a new "surprise." Hardly had they begun tracking the next blip when it suddenly separated. One signal began to move forward sharply at great speed. Where was the target? At that moment Capt Shevchenko displayed tactical skill. Ordering the operators to track the blip which remained, he shifted the equipment to another operating mode. The blip being tracked disappeared and the one moving at high speed could be seen well. That meant it was jamming. The master of combat qualification set a worthy example for subordinates and acted skillfully in the complex situation.

Using various methods the air defense personnel "stifled" the jamming and employed diverse tactics. They coped successfully with the assigned mission and brought all targets under fire at maximum range thanks to good psychological and physical conditioning.

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CSO: 1801/207

NAVAL FORCES

AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS DESCRIBED

Amphibious Landing Exercise During Storm

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank A. Slobozhanyuk: "The Landing Force Attacks from the Sea. A News Report"]

[Text] According to all the forecasts, the typhoon should have been many hundreds of miles from the area where the large landing ship (BDK) was proceeding on its course. But, as though it were ridiculing the forecasts, the typhoon abruptly changed direction and its edge brushed the ship.

The crew immediately sensed the threatening breath of the elements. The rather rough sea, which had become, as it were, ordinary for several days of the voyage, increased from 6 scale units to 10 scale units.

The next wave, with a mass of many tons, struck the bow of the ship. The steel hull vibrated for about a minute. Captain 3rd Rank V. Tregubov calmly told the watch officer, Senior Lieutenant V. Kasimov: "Walk around the ship and see how the men are working."

Such walks around the ship have become the norm on the vessel during difficult cruises. The commander let the watch officer leave the bridge for a brief period soon after he had come on watch duty, so that the watch officer could visit the battle stations and the tank hold, to get a clear idea of the quality of watch-keeping by the sailors, the state of combat equipment fastening and the mood of the men. Tregubov also took into consideration the circumstance that, during such moments, the sailors especially need a kind word and a warm smile from Senior Lieutenant V. Kasimov, the deputy commander for political affairs.

First of all, Kasimov went down into the hold. The group of seamen headed by senior boatswain, Warrant Officer V. Yashchenko, was installing additional fastening for the tanks. Steel chains firmly joined the vehicles with the ship's deck. Then, under the bottom, lifting jacks were installed and the chains stretched. This work demanded both bravery and caution simultaneously. But the main thing needed is naval skill.

Time and again, the deck slipped out from under one's feet. The pitching motion was replaced by rolling motion and then the ship began to be thrown wildly in all directions. But the senior lieutenant understood that the sailors would finish the job in the hold, no matter how the ship tossed. And they will not suffer any injuries or bruises, since the warrant officer had taught his subordinates to work skillfully in the most complex situations.

Kasimov walked through the battle stations of the engineering department. There was a particularly large number of new sailors in this department. True, one need not be worried about the quality of watch operations and supervision. Engineer Captain-Lieutenant S. Kurtametov knows how to put the young sailors in battle formation quickly, since he fills every mile of the voyage with drills. Nor do the drills cease during a storm. Perhaps that is why there is not a single seaman in the department now who would give in to the tossing. Moreover, while walking around the entire ship, Kasimov became convinced that the fierce storm would not overcome anyone in the crew. The men's mood is cheerful, they keep the night watch vigilantly.

The large landing ship arrived at the prescribed point in a timely manner and then began moving, as part of the cruising formation, to the place of the landing operation.

By then, the storm had subsided. But a new test began for the sailors--the test of combat. The "enemy" had detected them at dawn and immediately tried to attack with guided-missile boats. But the flagship quickly re-formed the landing party to fend off the attack and foiled the enemy's plan. Soon after, the practice alarm signal sounded. Four fighter-bombers were coming to attack the large landing ship. Captain-Lieutenant Yu. Tsvigun confidently directed the actions of the gunnery department (BCh-2). The sailors in this subunit had carried out all their firing missions with an excellent rating during the last training year. They are also continuing this good tradition in the new year, competing to provide a worthy reception for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Petty Officer 2nd Class A. Badmatarov and other sailors display a high skill level. The "enemy's" first air attack is repulsed, but it is followed by another attack. A "fire" is caused by a bomb "hit" in one of the compartments. And immediately a report from the landing battle station arrived at the main control station: "The 'hole' is below the waterline in the area of the frame."

An "enemy" motor torpedo boat had made the strike. The boat had succeeded in breaking through, past the escort ships. The damage-control party, commanded by Warrant Officer V. Yashchenko, works with maximum exertion of its strength. Gas masks make breathing difficult, the chemical kit inhibits movement, but the sailors work precisely and quickly. The ship must be saved, no matter what the cost; the landing troops must be taken to the shore. Incidentally, the landing troops are also struggling, with the crew, to ensure the ship's survivability. This is a habitual matter for the naval infantrymen commanded by Captain A. Kolesnikov. They have made many sea passages and carried out combat training missions.

The last tongue of the flames disappears beneath a powerful jet of water. A tightly-packed patch is put on the place of the "hole". The BDK continues to move to the shore occupied by the "enemy". And already the amphibious fire-support ships begin bombarding this shore with powerful missile and artillery strikes, trying to destroy strong points and neutralize weapon emplacements. Sea-going minesweepers clear a passage through the mine fields for the large landing ship.

The culmination point of the battle has arrived. The BDK's bow unit opens. One after another, amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers roll off the ramp into the water. Rocking slightly in the waves of the tide, the vehicles which weigh many tons float to shore and roll out onto land. The mine specialists quickly make passages through the mine fields. And now the naval infantrymen charge forward like an avalanche. The beachhead for landing the main forces has been seized. Fluttering above a commanding height is the white and blue cloth of the naval flag.

'Krymskiy Komsomolets' Amphibious Assault

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank Gormalev of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet:
"Strike from the Sea"]

[Text] The large landing ship "Krymskiy Komsomolets", with naval infantry on board, approached the shore occupied by the "enemy". The combat escort ships started a practice battle with submarines and aircraft which were trying to prevent the landing force from disembarking. There were still several miles to travel, but the "enemy" had already opened fire. It became clear that the landing force could not be disembarked right away. It was decided to approach the shore more closely and neutralize the battery by naval ordnance.

Captain-Lieutenant G. Nekhoroshev, commander of the "Krymskiy Komsomolets", understood that it would not be easy to carry out the assigned task. Radar stations had detected his ship and were closely following its maneuvers. This hindered a sudden strike. Nekhoroshev ordered his men to lay an opposite course, for the purpose of convincing the "enemy" that the landing force was putting out to sea. But later, the ship would move along the shore, screened by a rocky ridge, and attack the battery.

A heavy, cold rain began. The wind raised the waves and malevolently whistled through the web of antennas. Heavy rolling hindered work at the battle stations. Due to the dense shroud of the fog, the shore was barely visible. The ship approached the prescribed grid at maximum speed. The final preparations were being made by the gunnery personnel. Senior Lieutenant Vasiliy Kul'pin attentively followed the work of his subordinates. The sailors worked continuously, the rudder signalers vigilantly kept watch. The crew worked through the task in a coordinated manner, not permitting a single malfunction.

For more than 10 years, the "Krymskiy Komsomolets" has been rated an excellent ship. Yet, the beginning of the new training year was not easy for the crew. Captain-Lieutenant Nekhoroshev had just taken over his new post. Experienced sailors had left for the reserves and the crew was reinforced with new recruits. The commander and his deputy for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Reshetilo, were both present at meetings of the Komsomol Bureau, checked the work of subordinates at battle stations and analyzed the quality of political and specialist training. The Komsomol activists became the combat assistants of the commander and the political officer. Petty Officer 1st Class Aleksandr Katyushanskiy, who is the secretary of the Komsomol Bureau, Petty Officer 1st Class Aleksandr Kruglov and Petty Officer 2nd Class Vladimir Boyko came forward as leaders of good work. Among those who set the tone for combat training were Warrant Officer Aleksandr Mukhovskiy, Petty Officer 1st Class Aleksandr Zarapin, Senior Seaman Sergey Kutlin and those who had arrived to serve on the ship as a Komsomol group. The group, headed by Petty Officer 1st Class Leonid Shade, put together several circuit diagrams, test stands and mock-ups, which helped many young seamen master their specialties in a brief period. The indices increased in competition; discipline and good organization among the seamen improved noticeably.

The crew challenged all sailors in the fleet to take up a shock combat watch in honor of the 19th Komsomol Congress. At that memorable meeting, the Komsomol members pledged to always be advanced and to carry out training missions and firing exercises in a high-quality manner. The crew's patriotic initiative was taken up by other crews.

The responsibility of the "Krymskiy Komsomolets" sailors for the success of their undertaking steadily increased. It manifested itself in surpassing the combat norms and irreproachably carrying out military duties. At one of the controlled exercises prior to the ship putting out to sea, the commander noted with satisfaction the increased level of training of Senior Seamen Gunners Aleksey Bogdanov and Yuriy Mironyuk. Senior Seaman Bogdanov particularly distinguished himself. During his breaking-in period, Bogdanov was instructed in gunnery matters by Senior Seaman S. Yakubov. Yakubov is now in the reserves. But after each success in combat training, Aleksey Bogdanov sends a cordial letter to his old comrade in far-off Uzbekistan.

At the concluding stage of the winter training period, the commander checked up on the crew. He remained satisfied with the sailors. At parting he said: "The sea will show how strong a leader's voice is. There is a particular demand for men with initiative!"

The starting line for the strike was approaching. The "Krymskiy Komsomolets" emerged from behind the rocky ridge. The count was down to seconds.

The commander ordered: "Lay a combat course!" A minute remained before target acquisition would be received.

The command, repeated by the commander of BCh-2 [Department-2], was conveyed to the battle stations. In an instant, the guns fired resonantly. The ship was enveloped in gun smoke. The gunners fired shell after shell in the

direction of the shore. According to information from observers, the shells landed exactly on target. Yes, now everything depended on the gunners' skill. The firing was conducted without a single stoppage. Having changed course sharply, the "Krymskiy Komsomolets" headed for water's edge. The sailors worked at the battle stations with reduced crews.

The ship was already approaching the shore, when with a rumble shells flew through the air, fired from the major-caliber guns of a cruiser which had arrived from the battle escort. The "enemy's" shore battery was neutralized. Tanks and armored personnel carriers raced to the shore, out of the open doors of the tweendeck.

The practice battle was in full swing. Bright flashes and the crash of salvos rolled further and further from the water's edge and the perimeters of the beachhead, which had been seized, were extended. The sun peeped out from behind the clouds and shone on the flag: the landing force had successfully consolidated its position on the crest of a coastal elevation.

9887

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CIVIL DEFENSE

RADIATION, CHEMICAL WARNING EXERCISE LECTURES

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 10 Mar 82)
pp 15-16

[Article by G. Mizikovskiy, methods specialist of Moscow City Institute for Teachers' Advanced Training: "For Those Who Train: In Response to Warning Signals"]

[Text] Topic 6

In the program the 6th topic is worded as follows: "Civil defense warning signals. Rules of conduct and actions by people in zones of radioactive and chemical contamination and in a center of bacteriological damage." All three classes (an hour each) are theoretical. But this does not mean that their methodology reduces to just a narrative or verbal presentation of training material. The instructor's task is considerably broader--arranging the lesson so that pupils are forced to make decisions in a particular concrete situation and forcing them to gain a feeling for the logic of these decisions. This achieves not only a training goal, but an indoctrinational goal as well: developing the schoolchildren's desire for unconditional and precise fulfillment of established rules of conduct in a difficult situation.

In studying this topic it is advisable to use the latest articles of the periodical press indicating the growing aggressiveness of imperialist powers, and the United States above all, and about its stepped-up production of new means of mass destruction.

A knowledge of warning signals and the ability to act in response to them represent one of the most important indicators for readiness for defense against mass destruction weapons. The military instructor has to consider that pupils already have assimilated some information earlier. For example, they practiced actions in response to the "Air Alert" signal in the 2d and 5th grades and during the "Zarnitsa" military sports game. In the 9th grade they also touched on the population's actions in a difficult situation in one way or another while studying mass destruction weapons and individual and collective protective gear.

Let us examine the specific methodology for conducting each class in this topic.

First class. The military instructor allocates approximately 10 minutes for studying civil defense warning signals. The second lesson--population actions in response to the "Radiation Danger" signal and in zones of radioactive contamination--is practiced for 20 minutes.

At the beginning of the class the military instructor emphasizes that a considerable number of civil defense measures will be taken even before the warning signals are given, with the appearance of a threat of enemy attack. The population, including schoolchildren, must take a most active part in preparing protective facilities and building those that are lacking, preparing individual protective gear, performing evacuation, fire protection, and light discipline measures at national economic facilities, and preparing their own home or apartment for protection against penetration of radioactive dust. Measures for protection against possible contamination of food products, water, forage and agricultural animals also are taken during the period of a threat of enemy attack. The large amount of work and extremely compressed time periods for performing it will require high efficiency, discipline and skilled, precise actions of each person who participates. Special attention should be given to this.

Then, using a table or blackboard on which all signals have been written ahead of time, the military instructor briefly explains what the "Air Alert," "All Clear from Air Alert," "Radiation Danger" and "Chemical Alarm" signals mean. The pupils themselves can tell about the first two signals. It remains for the instructor only to update and generalize their answers.

Then the military instructor moves on to the next lesson. Here he emphasizes that the danger of people being injured is not precluded even in those populated points where the enemy has not directly employed nuclear weapons. This danger is carried by the radioactive cloud, capable of moving great distances and contaminating vast territories.

The military instructor may suggest that pupils read on their own in the textbook about actions in response to the "Radiation Danger" signal (less than one page of text) so that subsequently reinforcement of the material studied can be organized by creating specific training situations. For example, he gives the following narrative problem: "The 'Radiation Danger' signal sounds over the radio. What are your actions?"

The schoolchildren have to answer how they will act in response to this signal. Putting on a respirator, antidust cloth mask or cotton-gauze bandage (or, if they are lacking, a protective mask), they will take a store of food and water, drugs and prime necessities and leave for the refuge or antiradiation shelter. They can emerge from protective facilities only on instructions of local civil defense entities.

When there is threat of exposure (for example, if they have to cross a contaminated sector) they must take antiradiation remedy No 1 from the first aid kit. In addition to special clothing one can use everyday or work clothing of any dense fabric, including ski outfits, working overalls, ponchos and capes of rubberized fabric or synthetics as means of skin protection. All buttons

have to be buttoned, sleeves and trouser cuffs ties with laces, and the collar raised and tied with a scarf to make the clothing more reliable protection against radioactive substances. Any gloves or mittens should be placed on the hands and rubber boots or overshoes on the feet.

A second narrative can be given the pupils: "You are in a room. There are no refuges or shelters nearby and the 'Radiation Danger' signal is heard. What are your actions?" The correct decision is to begin sealing the room urgently, close windows and doors, cover them with dense fabric and stop up the cracks.

Using the method of solving narratives it is advisable to practice conditions for staying on contaminated territory (the pupils drew information necessary for this from a textbook). Here is an example of such a narrative: "The CD staff has announced that we are in a zone of moderate (heavy, dangerous) radiation. What conditions must we adhere to?"

Here is the correct solution. In a zone of moderate contamination we will have to remain in the antiradiation shelter (refuge) from several hours to one day, and then we can move to an ordinary room. Before entering the room we must clean shoes and clothing of radioactive dust. On the first day it is possible to go outside for no more than four hours. We will have to remain in the shelter up to three days in a zone of heavy contamination. In a zone of dangerous contamination it is three days or more, after which it is possible to move to an ordinary room, where we must remain at least four days. It is permissible to go outside for a short time.

The civil defense staff will announce the time for mandatory stay in refuges and shelters. If for some reason such announcements were not received the population has to conduct itself as if in a zone of dangerous contamination.

Instances are possible where the population will be evacuated from zones of dangerous contamination (with radiation levels of over 240 roentgens per hour) to areas that are not contaminated or weakly contaminated. Evacuation is performed observing safety precautions on specially prepared closed transportation. Antiradiation remedy No 1 from the first aid kit is taken and individual protective gear put on before emerging onto contaminated terrain. All arriving at the destination undergo radiation monitoring and decontamination, and medical assistance is given to persons who have had radiation exposure.

It must be remembered that an intake of contaminated food and water also can be a cause of injury. Therefore we must not use food products which have been unprotected or drink water from open sources. In using milk that is not canned we must take antiradiation remedy No 2, one tablet daily for 10 days after radioactive fallout.

Second class. Its topic is the rules of conduct and actions of the population in response to the "Chemical Alarm" signal in a zone of chemical contamination and a center of bacteriological damage. In essence these are two independent lessons, with at least 15 minutes to be allocated to each of them.

The methods instructions for the "Civil Defense" section of the basic military training program for the youth state that it is best to hold this class while wearing protective masks, ensuring that they are worn continuously for up to 30 minutes. That means each pupil must be provided with a serviceable protective mask and the assistants--squad commanders--must be briefed ahead of time. Together with the military instructor, they will watch the pupils' behavior and physical condition and their observance of rules for using the protective mask.

Even before the protective masks are put on the military instructor explains that the "Chemical Alarm" signal is given over the rediffusion net at the threat of or detection of chemical or bacteriological contamination. The signal is repeated by rapid blows on objects that make noise. In response to this signal everyone immediately puts on protective masks and means of skin protection, authorized or improvised. If ordinary clothing is used it must be first impregnated with a special solution. It is desirable to put on rubber footwear and rubber mittens on the hands. If there is a refuge nearby it is advisable to take shelter there, but first remove and leave in the airlock used means of skin protection and outer clothing. Remain there until permission is received to emerge. It should be emphasized that serviceable refuges provide full protection against toxic chemical agents and bacteriological agents and there is no need to put on individual protective gear in them.

Now, when the pupils have a general idea how to act in response to the "Chemical Alarm" signal, they begin to work various training situations. The military instructor gives the "Chemical Alarm" signal (it is best to use a tape recording for this) and observes the pupils' actions. He pays special attention to precise observance of techniques for putting on the protective mask and capable use of clothing for protecting the skin. The pupils spend the remaining part of the lesson wearing protective masks.

The military instructor further gives the pupils a number of narrative problems. Narrative problem 1: "You are in a refuge. What are your further actions?"

After asking the pupils the question, he himself suggests the solution, which is as follows. They must remain there until permission comes to emerge. Before going outside, we put on protective masks and means of skin protection. Militia posts will show the direction for emerging from the stricken area. If there are no posts, we will emerge in a direction perpendicular to the wind direction. We will move quickly but cautiously over the contaminated territory without raising dust, without touching surrounding objects or vegetation, avoiding ravines and hollows where possible and, in a city, avoiding parks where OV [toxic chemical agent] vapors may be standing. Don't sit down, don't remove protective gear and gloves and don't step on visible drops or droplets of OV. If the boundaries of the contaminated area are marked, be guided by these signs and move only along the routes indicated.

Narrative problem 2: "Drops of toxic chemical agents have fallen on exposed parts of the body, clothing and footwear. What are your actions?"

Solution: In this situation immediately remove the OV drops with wads of gauze (cotton) and treat contaminated areas with liquid from the individual chemical defense kit.

Narrative problem 3: "You have emerged from the stricken area. What will be your further actions?"

Everyone must undergo complete decontamination. Clothing is subjected to radiation decontamination at special washing points.

The primary method in studying the lesson "The population's actions in a center of bacteriological damage" is a narrative with commentary about material presented in the basic military training text.

The military instructor announces "All Clear" 30 minutes after a "Chemical Alarm" signal sounded in the lesson and evaluates the schoolchildren's actions. Everyone who made mistakes in using the protective mask is given an unsatisfactory grade. They can correct it by taking this topic again during non-lesson time, with a mandatory 30 minute stay in the protective mask.

The methodology for holding the third class will be examined in the next issue of the journal.

Recommended literature and visual training aids are as follows: "Uchebno-metodicheskoye posobiye po nachal'noy voyennoy podgotovke" [Training Methods Aid on Basic Military Training], Moscow, "Prosveshcheniye," 1981, Chapter 8; "Grazhdanskaya oborona. Posobiye dlya podgotovki naseleniya" [Civil Defense: Text for Population Training], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, pp 81-123; "Civil Defense Tables: 9th Grade," Moscow, "Prosveshcheniye," 1979; film strip "Act Skillfully at the Threat of Attack and at the 'Air Alert' Signal"; the movie "Civil Defense Warning Signals," Part 3, 1981.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

TRAINING PROBLEMS IN GRIBANOV MACHINEBUILDING PLANT

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 10 Mar 82)
p 23

[Article by I. Shabrov, Gribanovskiy Rayon, Voronezhskaya Oblast: "In the Role of Outside Observer: Why Did the DOSAAF Rayon Committee Allow Inaction for Primary Organization?"]

[Text] The collective of the Gribanovskiy Machinebuilding Plant (Voronezhskaya Oblast) numbers several thousand persons. Some half of them are people under 30 years of age, young people drawn toward sports and thirsting for technical knowledge. The work of a DOSAAF primary organization seemingly should be especially active in such an enterprise. They say that at one time that is how it was. Classrooms in which motor vehicle and motorcycle drivers trained are left at the plant as a memory of that time. But now they are empty. Classes are not held and the visual aids--posters and displays--have faded and grown dim. In short, the courses are closed and, as it turned out, this was done by decision of the DOSAAF RK [rayon committee].

"Training of specialists at these courses did not meet existing requirements," we were told by F. Lunkin, chairman of the Defense Society rayon committee. "The means of training were primitive. There were no individual assemblies or vehicle components. Lectures were given by people at random. There was no training in practical driving at all because of the unserviceability of training equipment. At first we demanded that Buramenskiy, chairman of the DOSAAF primary organization, remedy the deficiencies. Unfortunately he did not carry out these instructions. Moreover, during the next 'major' discussion Buramenskiy frankly declared that he did not plan to do anything to improve the training process. Allegedly he had no time to take up secondary matters. There was much work to do in production. And so we had to take an extreme step and close the courses..."

Well, it was apparent from everything that this decision was dictated by existing circumstances. As a matter of fact, why train drivers who have neither firm technical knowledge nor practical skills? But isn't there a share of the blame for the DOSAAF raykom because now dozens of plant workers cannot acquire desired driver's licenses?

Of course, Comrade Buramenskiy is incorrect when he now accuses the raykom that it allegedly simply eliminated a competitor in order to conduct paid

driver training itself. The poor nature of the training facility of the plant courses and low level of instruction there were established by an authoritative commission which included workers of GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] and the Voronezhskaya Oblast committee of the Defense Society, so that there can be no question of the mercenary nature or prejudice of the raykom.

In our view the fault of the Gribanovskiy Rayon DOSAAF committee lies in the indifference toward the work of the machinebuilding plant's primary DOSAAF organization. As a matter of fact it has been seven years already since A. Buramenskiy has held the reins of control of the enterprise's defense collective. Work indicators of the organization have crept irresistibly downward for this entire period. Not one functioning technical circle is left at the enterprise. This indicates that the DOSAAF organization has been practically eliminated from performing a most important task of disseminating military-technical knowledge among the workers, and primarily the youth.

Military-patriotic indoctrination of young enterprise workers is conducted at a low level. Not one meeting with Soviet Army veterans or Great Patriotic War participants has been arranged for them of late through DOSAAF committee channels, although there are over 100 such persons at the enterprise itself. Not one topical evening has been held, not to mention trips to places of combat glory, agitation runs and so on.

There are no category-holders in technical military sports among draftees of the Gribanovskiy Machinebuilding Plant, and where could they come from when the enterprise didn't hold a single competition all of last year? There is no basic sports inventory and we will note that not once did the committee of the primary organization trouble itself with its acquisition.

They do not even know about such a widespread form of work with the youth as a send-off to the Army of draftees here. There is not a word of thanks for conscientious work nor friendly parting words to the lads...

We tried to find at least some traces of the work of the plant DOSAAF committee, but unsuccessfully. Its work plan has not been drawn up and there are no minutes of sessions. Membership dues are not collected and DOSAAF lottery tickets are not disseminated. In short, that's the limit, as they say. Did they know about this in the DOSAAF rayon committee? Yes they did, and Fedor Lunkin spares no words to depict A. Buramenskiy and at the same time the entire work style of the plant committee in the worst light. But did the raykom take any steps to adjust the work of the primary organization? No it didn't. It took a position of nonintervention. And the most surprising thing here is that we are talking about the largest organization in the rayon which is supposed to be a base for conducting all mass defense, military-patriotic, sports and training work in Gribanovka.

Is supposed to... DOSAAF raykom chairman F. Lunkin doesn't argue with this, but he isn't about to surrender his position: Since Buramenskiy is ignoring the Defense Society raykom, then the best response to this is to ignore him and at the same time the primary organization as a whole.

"We realize," we were told by A. Krasil'nikov, secretary of the party committee of the Gribovskiy Machinebuilding Plant, "that the work of our DOSAAF organization does not meet existing requirements. Unfortunately the DOSAAF raykom is not giving us concrete assistance in selection and training of people in the practice of military-patriotic, mass defense, training and sports work."

"This is not included in the functions of a DOSAAF raykom," objects its chairman. "Our chief task is to ensure fulfillment of planning quotas for the rayon as a whole, while the heads of individual enterprises, schools, kol-khozes and sovkhozes are responsible for their work."

It is not difficult to refute that standpoint. It is sufficient to glance at materials of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, which directly state that DOSAAF committees must constantly improve management of primary organizations, delve deeply into their work, respond promptly to their needs and requests, and persistently see to it that every DOSAAF collective works actively and purposefully.

It is quite obvious that the Gribovskiy Rayon committee of the Defense Society is not up to the tasks it is called upon to accomplish.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

NEW STATUTE ON 'ORLENOK' EXERCISES DISCUSSED

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p 26

[Article by L. Pesterev, chief of Main Staff of "Orlenok" All-Union Komsomol Military-Sports Game: "The Maturing of 'Orlenok'"]

[Text] On 18 April 1972 the newspaper KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA published a document which marked the beginning of a new, mass patriotic movement of the Soviet youth--the "Orlenok" All-Union Komsomol Military-Sports Game. This was Order No 1, signed by the commander in chief of the game, Twice Hero SU, USSR pilot-cosmonaut G. T. Beregovoy. It set the task of forming staffs and sub-units of "Orlenok" in secondary schools, PTU [vocational-technical schools] and tekhnikums and beginning vigorous work in various directions in preparing for military service.

Those April and May days are very memorable for me. Telegrams, letters and the first reports flew in to the "Orlenok" Main Staff and the mail brought them in bags. In reading them we members of the Main Staff again and again saw with satisfaction the advisability and timeliness of announcing the game and the fact that it had been accepted in outlying areas.

Now ten years later the army of "eaglets" numbers over 13 million, i.e., it has grown by more than fourfold since 1972. The content of the game and its organization and methodology have improved along with the growth in numbers. "Orlenok" organizers have achieved a great mass, systematic nature of military sports work in many training institutions, which contributes to a reinforcement of knowledge and practical skills in NVP [basic military training].

After call-up for active military service yesterday's young Army people usually quickly become outstanding in combat and political training, rated specialists, and VSK [military sports complex] badge wearers. Many soldiers who demonstrated models of execution and high professional schooling in Exercise "Zapad-81" last fall went through the Young Army school.

Thousands of "eaglets" have tied their fate forever with the Armed Forces. For example, Sverdlovsk resident Viktor Melyukhnov, a champion in the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] triathlon at the 1st All-Union Finals of the game in Minsk, completed military school and now already is a senior lieutenant. Or take Vologda native Nikolay Silin and Kaliningrad resident Sergey Kaygorodov,

the best commanders at the 2d All-Union Finals in Gor'kiy. The former completed the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov with excellence and the latter already is outstanding in training and is taking state exams in the Higher Naval Submarine School imeni Leninist Komsomol.

Pedagogic collectives work creatively in many of our educational institutions and military instructors put much time and effort into military sports work. Among them I would like to mention above all the genuine party members and frontlinesmen V. Bondarenko (SSh [Secondary School] No 7 of the city of Baltiysk, Kaliningradskaya Oblast), who by the way recently was awarded the "Emblem of Honor" order; I. Lipchuk (GPTU [City Vocational-Technical School] No 145 of the city of Moscow); A. Popov (SSh No 29 of the city of Vologda); and N. Orekhov (Moscow Electronic Instruments Tekhnikum).

Meanwhile, analyzing the past decade, we cannot say that everything has gone and is going smoothly. In places the oblast, kray and republic staffs of "Orlenok," Komsomol and DOSAAF committees, and entities of people's, vocational-technical, higher, and secondary specialized education are not taking effective steps to introduce and develop the game, and as a result its value in communist indoctrination of the youth and training for defense of the Motherland is underestimated in some educational institutions.

A number of schools, vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums of Lipetskaya, Kostromskaya, Vladimirskaia, Yaroslavskaya, Orenburgskaya, Amurskaya and Ashkhabadskaya oblasts, Khabarovskiy Kray, Tuvinskaya ASSR, Dagestanskaya ASSR and Kirgiz SSR are making poor use of the opportunities of the Komsomol military sports game for involving every pupil in daily mass defense work. Only a small part of teenagers and young boys and girls is engaged in regular military sports activities during nonschool time. As a result few of them fulfill the complex norms of basic military training and the GTO complex. Unfortunately the following facts also still are being encountered: Adults--military instructors and directors--are being appointed to posts of commanders of Young Army battalions; the staff work plan and reports to the Main Staff often are not written at all by Young Army persons.

In January 1982 the Komsomol CC, USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Minpros [Ministry of Education], USSR Minvuz [exact expansion unknown], USSR Gosprofobr [State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education], USSR Sportkomitet [Committee for Physical Culture and Sports], USSR DOSAAF CC, USSR CD Staff, and Executive Committee of SOKK i KP SSSR [USSR Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent] adopted the decree "On further development of the 'Orlenok' All-Union Komsomol Military Sports Game," and approved an improved Statute.

The basis of the decree contains demands of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers for improving basic military training. A fundamentally new and important definition of the "Orlenok" game is given--it is the primary and compulsory form of mass defense work outside the classroom and of basic military and physical training for the youth for every secondary school, vocational-technical school and tekhnikum. The director of the educational

institution exercises organizational and pedagogic direction of "Orlenok"--he mobilizes class instructors, masters of production training and the entire pedagogic collective for organizing the game and assists the council of consultants, the Komsomol committee and battalion staff in its logistical and organizational support.

The Statute states that teenagers and young boys and girls--pupils in grades 8-10 (11) of secondary schools, vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums no older than 19 years of age--can take part in the game. Duties and rights of the Young-Army person are enumerated.

Requests of eighth graders to include them in the ranks of "eaglets" have been considered. Naturally, considering the age features, they are given lower requirements in Young Army training as for first year students of tekhnikums who are not studying NVP.

Special attention is given to the role and place of mentors of Young Army persons united in the consultants' council of the educational institution battalion. The military instructor is the main consultant. He teaches the mentors and platoon consultants, who have to be chosen from among servicemen, students and so on.

And if there is neither a university nor military unit in a particular city or rayon, what is to be done? Then NCO's who served as junior commanders and rated specialists and who have been released to the reserve should be involved in the work with young children. They are present in any enterprise, establishment, kolkhoz or sovkhoz. Most important is to find and select the best, give them the ABC's of methods and pedagogic knowledge and help them in every way. If we send such people to every Young Army platoon a real opportunity will present itself to accomplish the chief tasks facing the "Orlenok" game.

Now a regulation of military sports activities of Young Army persons has been legalized, and not only by the Statute on the "Orlenok" game, but also by the NVP program. From now on they must be conducted weekly everywhere. The format of the activities--Young Army Man's Day--is uniform for game participants. Its content is determined by the Komsomol committee and battalion staff based on the overall plan of training and indoctrination work of the educational institution, and is approved by the director.

Other compulsory activities are provided in addition to Young Army Man's Day: the "Young Army GTO triathlon for prizes named for Komsomol heroes" competitions, Operation "Road of Heroes," a new Operation "Defense" (during which quizzes, practices and competitions in civil defense, and outfitting and construction of very simple CD protective structures are organized), Operation "Dolphin" (involving swim training, conduct of competitions and preparation of swimming areas), the "Young Army Concern for the Basic Military and Physical Training Facility!" competitive review and, finally, the game's annual finals in the educational institution.

Among the compulsory activities for the Young Army persons are military sports activities, competitions in Komsomol aktiv camps, labor and rest camps,

production brigades, construction detachments, and defense-sports health camps, and tourist excursions through a native area in the summer.

Now a few words about the game's all-union finals. Their participants are subdivided into two age groups: The first, junior, consists of Young Army persons from secondary schools, schools and tekhnikums from 15 to 17 years of age, and the second of Young Army persons from educational institutions ranging in age from 17 to 19. Squads from educational institutions in which game finals were not held are not allowed to participate in rayon or city final competitions, not to mention all-union finals.

The Main Staff names participants of the All-Union Final on the basis of results of mass defense and sports work with student youth in the oblast, kray and republic. Its results also are considered in determining places taken by Young Army squads in the All-Union Final.

This approach to matters will permit a more objective determination of the really best collectives, which will be deservedly entered in the Honor Book of the Main Staff of the "Orlenok" All-Union Game.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

LECTURE ON HAND GRENADES FOR MILITARY INSTRUCTOR

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[Article by Col K. Kolpakov: "To Help the Military Instructor: Hand Grenades (Methodology for Study of Equipment and Throwing Techniques)"]

[Text] Needed for study of the RGD-5 and F-1 fragmentation hand grenades will be posters on their design, a table of primary combat specifications, practice igniter sets, grenades and their mock-ups. Attention must be given each time in classes and practices to safety precautions.

First of all the military instructor says that fragmentation hand grenades are intended for hitting enemy personnel in close combat with fragments (in an attack, in trenches, in refuges, populated points, the forest, mountains, and so on). The Soviet Army has the RGD-5 and F-1 grenades in the inventory.

The military instructor shows students practice grenades and asks them to tell how they differ outwardly from each other and why this is. After hearing two or three answers it must be explained that the RGD-5 is an offensive grenade and the F-1 is defensive. This division is made based on the distance of the fragmentation pattern after the burst (up to 25 m for the RGD-5 and up to 200 m for the F-1).

The RGD-5 and F-1 (sometimes called "pocket artillery") are powerful, reliable weapons. Using the table, the military instructor gives their primary combat specifications and states that the operating principle of the grenades' mechanism is the delay. They are fitted with the UZRGM [standardized hand grenade detonator] igniter set. Its detonator ignites at the moment of the throw and the blast occurs in 3.2-4.2 seconds (in this time the grenade will fly a certain distance, hence the name "delay").

Then the military instructor moves on to the design of the RGD-5 and F-1. Using posters or mock-ups he explains that both grenades consist of a body, bursting charge and igniter set. But a tube is fastened to the upper part of the body on the RGD-5 which serves to connect the igniter set and seal the bursting charge. A plastic plug is screwed into it (the igniter set is inserted in its place prior to the grenade's use). In addition the upper part of the body has an outer casing (called a cap) and a cap insert.

The body of the F-1 is cast iron, with longitudinal and transverse grooves. The grenade bursts into fragments along them. The upper part of the body has an opening with threads for screwing in the igniter set. It is closed with a plastic plug during storage and while being carried.

Then the military instructor tells about the UZRCM (standardized hand grenade detonator, modernized) and demonstrates its design. During the explanation it must be emphasized in particular that it is categorically prohibited to disassemble the detonators and check the operation of the striker mechanism. The safety pin is authorized to be pulled only prior to throwing and in so doing the striker lever is pressed to the grenade body with the fingers (to be shown in the practice cutaway grenade). After the grenade is thrown the striker lever rotates under the action of the striker spring and releases the striker, which moves forward vigorously and pricks the igniter set cap.

Training models, mock-ups and posters must be used in explaining the functioning of parts and mechanisms of the grenade when thrown and techniques of preparing it for throwing.

The military instructor ensures that the material covered has been assimilated by asking a few questions, then he directs the students' attention to the distance to which offensive grenades are thrown. One can ask why it is specifically 40-50 m, listen to the answers and then explain that this is the safest distance for a soldier since the fragmentation pattern is 25 m and from the moment he throws to the moment of the burst (the grenade's flight time is 3-4 seconds), a soldier moving at a run or speed marching step (a speed of 2-4 m/sec) will cover 10-15 m. The F-1 is thrown only from a trench or reliable cover.

The class concludes with questions.

The future soldiers learn to throw hand grenades systematically at almost every shooting practice. These skills are improved in tactical training classes.

Initially the pupils throw offensive grenades (they are lighter), then defensive ones.

They first master techniques of priming and unpriming grenades and safety precautions. Then they practice skills in throwing grenades for distance and accuracy from the most comfortable position (standing in place, initially at a distance of approximately 15-20 m). After that the lads learn to throw grenades from the kneeling and prone positions and while moving on foot. To avoid pulling muscles they must first perform physical exercises and throw a practice grenade several times, putting all effort into the throw. Practice grenades are used in classes and practices which correspond in shape, weight and design to live grenades. They are fitted with a practice igniter set with lever and safety pin.

Throwing techniques are learned by the numbers (sections).

During the practice of priming and unpriming hand grenades the military instructor explains that if the detonator does not screw in freely, no efforts must be applied, as this might lead to an accident.

In this situation it is necessary to unscrew the igniter set from the grenade, wipe its tube and try to repeat the operation. If this again fails, the igniter set is replaced.

When throwing of hand grenades from in place is being learned, the military instructor should require that the boys firmly press the striker lever to the grenade body with their fingers and throw at an angle of near 45 degrees, which assures greatest flight distance.

In order to practice skills throwing at an angle of 45 degrees the military instructor places the trainees three meters from three-meter stakes with a rope stretched between them and orders them to throw grenades across the rope. He emphasizes that prior to throwing a skilled soldier quickly evaluates the strength and trajectory needed to throw the grenade (to aim) so that it hits the target. We recommend giving pupils the following advice: If you do not have the strength to throw the grenade to the target, throw from a short run. When the grenade deviates from the target or is short this means that the trainee held it in his hand too long during the throw. When the grenade deviates to the right or flies too high it was released too early from the hand.

After the pupils have learned techniques of throwing grenades while standing in place on open terrain the military instructor moves on to practice in throwing from behind cover. For a throw from behind the left side of the cover, the grenade is held in the right hand, the pupil stands up with his right side to the cover, puts the right leg forward, pulls the safety pin, steps forward with the left leg, simultaneously turns his chest toward the target, swings his arm, throws the grenade at the target without delaying and immediately takes cover.

Throws from a kneeling and prone position as well as during movement while operating in dismounted formation are practiced in the very same sequence. Special mention should be made of the latter method: Initially the future soldiers are taught to throw grenades from a short halt, and later when moving in quick time and when running.

A sector of terrain is prepared for the class. A trench is dug, lines 25, 30, 35 and 40 m from it are marked, from which grenades are thrown, and an initial position is marked 50-60 m from the trench.

Throwing hand grenades from a short halt can be learned by the numbers: At the command "Do one," take the weapon in the left hand while continuing movement, take a grenade from the grenade pouch with the right hand; at the command "Do two," pull the safety pin with the left hand, pressing the striker lever to the grenade body; at the command "Do three" (it is given on the left foot),

stop on the right foot, simultaneously swing the grenade forward and downward, turn the body to the right and bend the right leg at the knee; at the command "Do four," step with the left foot, straightening the right leg vigorously and sharply turning the chest toward the target, and throw the grenade; at the command "Do five," continue movement.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

LECTURE ON ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE (BRDM) CAPABILITIES

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[Article by Engr-Col V. Knyaz'kov: "Talks with Draftees: Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle"]

[Text] The BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicle is a wheeled, double-axle all wheel drive, amphibious, closed vehicle (with opening roof). The armament is a 7.62-mm SGMB [Goryunov improved heavy machinegun] with maximum sighted range of 2,300 m and a rate of fire up to 700 rounds per minute. It has belt feed, with 250 cartridges in each belt. The entire unit of fire is 1,250 rounds. There are two Kalashnikov submachineguns, nine F-1 grenades and a 26-mm signal pistol with 21 cartridges in the unit of fire. It can move along a highway at a speed of 80 km/hr. If an obstacle is encountered en route such as a broad trench the driver places four more wheels into operation. They are smaller in size than the main wheels and are called supplementary wheels. They have pneumatic tires 700 x 250 mm in size. When the supplementary wheels are lowered and rest on the ground the vehicle turns into a "myriapod" with a hull length of 5,600 mm and in this form is capable of crossing a trench or ditch up to 1,220 mm wide.

All of the armored vehicle's wheels have been made as driving wheels. This is especially important when very difficult terrain sectors must be crossed. As soon as a steep climb is encountered or the BRDM gets in difficult road conditions the driver engages the front axle. If an especially difficult road situation arises he shifts to lowest gear. You can be sure that this vehicle will not let you down. It is capable of moving under various road conditions: in the mud, in marshy and sandy sectors, and on snowcovered expanses. It was not enough that the designers provided supplementary wheels, they also introduced another interesting device. This essentially is an entire system for adjusting air pressure in the tires, made in a centralized configuration. The driver turns on a compressor which changes pressure in the tires. This can be done both while parked and while the vehicle is moving. Moreover the driver can adjust air pressure in all tires simultaneously or in each one individually.

Under normal operating conditions normal tire pressure should be 3 kg/cm². But the BRDM specifically is a vehicle intended for operation under abnormal conditions. Here the driver acts as an active link in a unique automated control system, figuratively speaking.

Let's say the vehicle has entered a swampy terrain sector. What does the driver do? He shifts into lower gear, usually second, and reduces air pressure in all tires to 0.5-0.75 kg/cm². Speed drops to 10 km/hr. The explanation is simple and is well confirmed by practice. When pressure in the tires drops they "flatten" as it were, the bearing surface area increases, the amount of unit pressure on the ground consequently drops and the vehicle's trafficability naturally improves.

And one other feature should be emphasized. If several BRDM's are proceeding over a marshy sector of terrain, each vehicle must make its own path. It is categorically prohibited to move in the tracks of a vehicle ahead. But when moving over sandy areas the reverse is true. Increase tire pressure to 0.75-1.5 kg/cm² and move in the path of the vehicle moving ahead at a distance of 40-50 m.

What is to be done in winter? It also has its features. It is possible to move over a snowcovered expanse and not reduce tire pressure if the depth of snowcover is no more than 300 mm. In this case the wheels crush through the layer of snow and have good traction with the firm base of frozen soil. But if the snowcover depth is more than 300 mm, then tire pressure is reduced to 0.75-1.5 kg/cm² depending on compactness of the snow.

But combat is combat and anything can happen. What if a tire is damaged suddenly? Does that mean changing the tire under enemy fire? A forced halt and as a result a delay in performing the operation order? No, the adjustment system helps out. We will recall that the driver can keep a check on air pressure in every tire. As soon as he notices a drop in pressure in any one of them he turns on the compressor, which will make up for the air loss directly during vehicle movement.

Now let us try to model the most improbable critical situation where the BRDM suddenly gets stuck in a difficult sector. The 90 hp engine is not coping with the load as the swamp holds the five-ton vehicle tenaciously. To tear the BRDM from this prison we resort to a capstan which in essence is a self-recovery expedient. Its drum and reel of line can be seen easily in the diagram [diagram not reproduced]. In such an extreme instance the nearest tree, stump or post within the length of the line (50 m) is chosen or, if none of those are present, then an anchor is fixed in the ground. A tow line with pulley block is fastened to it and then the capstan line is adjusted. The drive is turned on at low engine rpm. The power developed is sufficient to extract the heavy vehicle. In any case the tractive effort on the line with the pulley block is no less than four tons.

It makes sense to give other indicators of the BRDM which describe its combat capabilities relating particularly to maneuverability and trafficability. The minimum turning radius is 8 m. The steepest slope the vehicle can negotiate on firm soil is up to 30 degrees, and it can have a tilt up to 25 degrees.

The BRDM's range is 500 km. As stated earlier it is amphibious and can develop maximum speed on the water up to 9 km/hr, provided by a reactive type water-jet. Water is taken in from the outside through an intake pipe, then is

supplied to the impeller mounted on the shaft. The shaft is driven from a power take-off.

The vehicle is easily controlled afloat using water rudders mounted in the hull behind the impeller. If necessary it is possible to float in reverse. For this the driver closes the water-jet propeller shutter and then water is sent from the impeller to the reverse pipes. The armored vehicle can remain afloat for a total of up to 12 hours.

The BRDM has B-1 vision units installed in the covers of the driver's and commander's vision hatches, and the TVN-2 infrared night vision device. Thanks to this the vehicle is capable of moving at night practically at the same speed as during the day. The TVN-2 device has an interesting attachment--a screening device (flap) which eliminates the blinding effect of oncoming illumination from strong light sources: vehicle headlights, missiles, fires and so on, while visibility through the device is not degraded.

The reconnaissance vehicle also has special devices installed because of the features of modern combat. Above all it is the DP-3 radiation reconnaissance device, the sensor of which is attached to the engine compartment bulkhead. There is also the PKhR-54 chemical reconnaissance device and the R-113 tank shortwave radio capable of providing communications to a distance up to 20 km in the microtelephone mode.

Combat equipment in the inventory is being developed and improved continuously. On the back cover you will see one of the modifications of the armored reconnaissance vehicle, the BRDM-2 [not reproduced].

It weighs seven tons and the powerful 140 hp four-cycle engine provides high dynamic and speed qualities: the BRDM-2 develops a speed up to 100 km/hr (on water up to 10 km/hr) and is capable of negotiating slopes up to 30 degrees. It has a crew of five. The vehicle is armed with two coaxial machineguns installed in the turret--a 14.5-mm KPVT [Vladimirov heavy caliber tank machinegun] and the 7.62-mm PKT [Kalashnikov tank machinegun]. In addition to "conventional" optics permitting crew members to conduct continuous surveillance in any direction, there also are night vision devices. In addition the BRDM-2 is equipped with special navigational gear including a control panel, course and route sensors, computation device (coordinator) and course converter.

Summing up, we can note that these high-speed, maneuverable vehicles, which are small in size and weight, are excellent assistants for scouts.

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6904

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

PROBLEMS AT MILITARY SCHOOLS DISCUSSED

Selection of Cadet Commanders Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Zayets of the M. V. Frunze Kiev Officer Training School: "Aptitude is Required. Improving the Selection of Cadet Subunit Commanders"]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant A. Tarasov arrived at our school as commander of a cadet platoon. He took control of a subunit which had distinguished itself with a high level of academic progress and discipline. Time passed and the platoon began to surrender the positions it had gained. The young commander was not reprimanded for this. A man should be supported during the difficult period of transition and should be helped in mastering more complex duties. But gradually it became clear that Tarasov was hindered not so much by a lack of experience as by indifference to duty, lack of self-discipline and sometimes a lack of diligence. He spurns his subordinates and avoids individualized educational work.

What is the problem? Perhaps, for some reason Tarasov lost the qualities for which he was recommended for duty as the commander of the cadet subunit? No, there were different reasons. Here is what was written in the first appraisal of this officer when he was in his final year as a cadet: "He is reticent, lacks initiative and is unsociable. He is not respected by his commanders or fellow cadets. He needs to be controlled. He did not participate in the social life." Serious shortcomings were also noted in Senior Lieutenant Tarasov's next appraisal. Nevertheless, the officer was entrusted with a job where the ability to work with people, a propensity for teaching and personal exemplariness are strongly required.

If this were an exceptional case, a mistake which the authorities quickly tried to correct, it would hardly be worthwhile writing about it. But it is not difficult to cite other examples where the deciding factor in assigning an officer to be commander of a cadet subunit was not his abilities or aptitude, but rather the fact that there were no other vacancies at a given moment. It also happens that personnel organs yield to pressure from an officer who is trying to end up at a large garrison or city and will take any

job. As regards Senior Lieutenant Tarasov, it seems to me that he was sent to the school to be straightened out. His superiors probably said: "The school has a strong and mature group of officers. Maybe they can help straighten out this careless officer." But, did they consider the specific character of the job? Didn't they forget about the cadets, who need a skillful and concerned educator, a strict and demanding senior comrade whose example they can follow?

If you look at the training of a future officer comprehensively, it does not just involve lectures, field exercises, tests, examinations and practical training for cadets in military units. It also involves the large amounts of schooling right in the cadet sub-unit, where the student, in four years, gains experience in organizing according to regulations, in military routine and learns about the practice of party political work. He intently observes the daily service activity of platoon leaders, company and battalion commanders and imitates a great deal of their service activity, as life convincingly demonstrates.

A conversation with the officers of one of the units comes to mind. Captain A. Shulepov, commander of a motorized rifle company, said: "In difficult moments, I mentally confer with Colonel Kutniy, the commander of our cadet battalion. It would be hard to become like him, but you want to. If he issued a reproof, it was done such that one didn't lose heart. If he praised you, you didn't become conceited. On the contrary, you felt that you were obliged to work even better." Captain Shulepov departed the school 6 years ago. But, as we see, he didn't forget the commanders of his cadet years. Moreover, he checks his decisions and actions with them.

I know that there are thousands of motorized rifle officers, serving in various parts of our motherland and abroad, who upon hearing the name of Colonel Kutniy, can proudly say: "He was our commander!" It is hard to forget the officer under whose command you gained your lieutenant's stars. It is particularly hard to forget a commander such as Ivan Mikhaylovich Kutniy, a demanding and sympathetic commander who is able to share with the cadets all their joys and misfortunes, who provides an example of self-sacrifice in military work.

Ivan Kutniy entered the military in 1944. He was in combat. After the victory, he studied at a school for sergeants and then at an officer training school. He commanded a platoon, then a company. He was noted for his ability to gain people's favor and also for his constant and purposeful work to improve himself. His subordinates and fellow-officers respected Kutniy for the breadth of his cultural horizon and for his adherence to party principles.

Such men are valued in regiments and their superiors don't want to part with them. But it is evident from the documents characterizing Ivan Kutniy that his unit commander was not guided by the narrow interests of the moment. He insistently recommended the regiment's best officer for the job of commander of a cadet subunit. Let Kutniy cultivate and educate other officers to be like himself. And Ivan Mikhaylovich found his location at the officer

training school. For more than 30 years already, he has labored at the school with enthusiasm, unquenchable interest in his work and a high level of party responsibility.

Wherever one happened to encounter graduates of the school, they without fail remembered their cadet battalion commander. In one of the garrisons, Lieutenants N. Nazarchuk, V. Ivanov and B. Borisov said that it was Colonel Kutniy who taught them to not fear difficulties, to value an officer's honor and who instilled confidence in ultimate success. For the young officers, as well as for Captain Shulepov, a great deal of what was practiced by the cadet's battalion's commander became their standard of professional skill.

The graduates of the school remember, with gratitude, Captain Yu. Bubnovskiy and Senior Lieutenants S. Sidorov, V. Okrugin and M. Konstantinov. Of course, these commanders do not yet have the rich experience which Ivan Mikaylovich Kutniy has, but they are similar to him in their devotion to their work and their understanding that the attentive and inquisitive eyes of the cadets are following their every step.

Selecting officers for jobs as commanders of cadet subunits is not a simple task. It involves, after all, young officers. Even if they distinguished themselves withoutstanding studies at the school and with zeal in active duty, that is not enough to designate them as masters of training and education. It is important to see their inclinations and potential, which come to light later. It is also important to understand an individual's personal aspirations.

Not everyone begins his service as commander of a cadet subunit successfully. I remember how Lieutenant Ye. Reznikov, a graduate of the military school, arrived in the battalion commanded by Colonel I. Kutniy. Good theoretical training, precise knowledge of drill formations and physical toughness were characteristic of Reznikov. But when the semester totals were computed, it turned out that the lieutenant's platoon was among the laggards, both in accademic progress and in discipline. Someone (there are always hot-heads) came to a hasty conclusion: "We should remove the officer from this job which is beyond his capabilities." Fortunately for Reznikov, the battalion commander had a different opinion.

Colonel Kutniy used to visit the platoon during many of the exercises and analyzed them thoroughly. He was strict and did not make allowances for Reznikov's youth. But neither did he draw conclusions which offended the officer's self-esteem. Criticism was combined with advice about how to be better prepared for the next exercise. In the process of this team work, Lieutenant Reznikov progressed step by step and felt more confident. Lieutenant Colonel V. Buknar', the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, was also painstaking in helping his organize educational work and rely on the party group and Komsomol organization.

The time came when Yevgeniy Reznikov was named as one of the advanced commanders of subunits. This was inevitable, because the officer from the very

start possessed good background knowledge, an ardent desire to work, a strict and honest attitude towards himself.

It is entirely understandable that the school cannot count on replacing Reznikov with commanders who are already completely formed and are equally strong in all areas. Who will prepare them for the school?

It is a question of something else--a question of the special character of the job as commander of a cadet subunit. Only worthy, mature, forward-looking officers who can master well the art of educating future officers can be recommended for this job. Furthermore, this job, by its very nature, requires a vocation and cannot tolerate experiments doomed to failure, as in the case of Senior Lieutenant A. Tarasov. Errors in staffing commanders for military educational institutions are particularly perceptible and effect the quality of training for young officers. I think that it is not out of place to remind ourselves of this, particularly now when the regularly-scheduled appraisal of officers has begun.

Tactical Problems Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Col V. Yaremko, candidate of military sciences: "A Degree of Approximation. Military Educational Institutions: Quality of Instruction"]

[Text] The tanks and infantry combat vehicles [BMP] swiftly and mightily advanced to the "enemy's" strong point. The attack looked fine. But an attentive observer could not fail to notice that the ordnance of some of the tanks was not in firing position.

One of the crews had not even uncovered its gun. Later, when a representative from higher headquarters asked Senior Lieutenant V. Platonov, a company commander, to draw a disposition diagram of the "enemy's" guns reconnoitred prior to the battle and discovered in the course of the battle, the officer could not do it.

This is a case of very serious oversimplification. Essentially, there was no battle. An attack was simulated against a very vague enemy, who was designated by a few targets. What is to blame for the poor organization of this exercise? In the first place, of course, the director of the exercise, an experienced and well-trained officer, is to blame. That was done at the exercise critique. But the company commander was punished only with a poor evaluation, even though his guilt was not at all limited to the fact that he had not demanded that his subordinates prepare their weapons for battle. The subunit commander had allowed himself to attack an "enemy" who had not been reconnoitred. Nor did this commander exhibit persistence and consistency in studying the disposition of the "enemy's" guns.

I did not have occasion to participate in the preparation of the exercise. Nonetheless, I didn't feel very comfortable at the critique. After all,

shortcomings in our work of instructing about the tactical disciplines, showed up in the practice battle.

Do we instructors always teach our students about ground operations and practical organization of combat operations? Not always. As a rule, graduates know how to develop detailed, clear, and quite often, even colorful plans. Everything connected with a practice battle is reflected in these plans. But if the aim of the plan is fully realized, it is only in demonstration drills and exercises. A great many deviations are tolerated in regular exercises which are not demonstrated exercises.

The tactical situation is over-simplified. The composition, equipment and character of the "enemy's" actions are designated by considerably fewer targets than required in reality. The "enemy" is not always situated where a real enemy would be located.

Of course, theoretically, any of the officers would be a determined opponent of slowness and negligence of security of combat operations. But, when solving tasks in a field training battle, an officer doesn't seem to notice at all that his subunits are standing idle for hours in close formations, he doesn't concern himself at all with camouflage. And this is not a question of tactical errors, but rather, of incorrect moral aims. Such an officer has resigned himself to the idea that in a conventional exercise, conventions in camouflage and subunit idleness are also inevitable. Who, better than instructors in military schools and academies, can inculcate in officers an intolerance towards indulgences and over-simplifications, a striving during any exercise to attain the maximum approximation of the situation to real combat?

In recent years, the percentage of two-sided tactical exercises has noticeably increased. However, I think that the question of their logistics, particularly in designating the "enemy," is still a problem today. The presence of a strong, technically well-equipped and tactically competent enemy must become an indisputable law and norm for any exercise, regardless of its scale and worked-out theme. By its very content and nature, an exercise must accustom cadets and students to the idea that combat is an intense struggle of minds, tactics and modern weapons.

Sometimes, in our pursuit of visible results, we emasculate the very essence of a combat training task. We don't teach how to "think it over," how to excel in military skill and we don't teach about a specific "enemy's" stratagem. Instead we teach how to attain a great deal of precision and impressive combat operations.

For instance, the following episode from an exercise illustrates this problem. It was a pleasure to observe the firing by the gunners of the artillery battalion commanded by Captain P. Grinyuk. The gun crews worked quickly and skillfully with youthful daring. The subunit reminded one of a finely-tuned clockwork. Of course, a great deal of credit for this belonged to the artillery battalion commander and the battery commanders. But then a senior officer became interested in finding out what sort of targets were to be

destroyed during the weapon training, how many shells were required for this, what sort of shells were required and why shells of that sort were required. And it turned out that no one had really thought about these issues. The gunners fired at an anonymous and extremely conventional "enemy," and were mostly concerned about exceeding the norms and expending ammunition in a timely manner. In such a case, can one say that the gunners experienced the nature of modern combat during the exercise? No, hardly.

Designating an "enemy" is not enough to assure that there will be a struggle between the sides during an exercise. It seems to me that there must be a combination of two exercise themes. If offensive operations, for instance, are developed in one subunit, then defensive operations should be developed in another subunit. I emphasize that these operations are not designated, but are developed fully and thoroughly. This means that the exercise director will devote equal attention to each side, will be equally detailed and thorough in analyzing their operations, and will be equally strict in evaluating them. Of course, the operations must not be developed according to a plan drawn up earlier, but must be in accord with decisions by the commanders of the two sides and with the actual course of events. Preparing and conducting such exercises requires a high degree of skill in training methods. It is for us, the instructors, to lay the foundations of this skill.

Military educational institutions could do more to foster analytical thinking, initiative and independence among their students. Students quite often solve tactical problems which do not require one to penetrate into the essence of a situation or search for original and non-standard solutions. Everything is reduced to computing the relative strengths in men and equipment. He who has the fewest men and equipment suffers defeat. But is that the situation in a real battle? Doesn't this bare "mathematics" push into the background the principle that victory is not gained by numbers, but by skill?

In military academies active use is made of the group training exercise, as a form of professional training for students. This exercise has many virtues. But there are shortcomings, about which Colonel F. Sverdlov, senior instructor at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy, wrote correctly in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. He told of an incident when an entire group of students had the same solution for an offensive operation. In other words, most of the officers "hired" the solution which had been worked out by the more advanced students and transferred it, ready-made, to their maps. That is not how you foster initiative, commander's courage and decisiveness among students.

Among the troops, you encounter the commander who follows a prescribed plan and is ready at any moment to disavow a decision he has made if it does not please a senior officer for some reason, and you encounter the commander who loses his self-possession in a critical situation. When you encounter such commanders, you unwittingly think: "We are also to blame for all this, due to our omissions in teaching and even more, in education." A young commander follows a plan, while organizing a battle. But we are sometimes

excessively attached to a plan, while organizing the training process. We experiment less frequently than demanded by the interests of the matter. We gravitate towards what is habitual and tested. Only a teacher who is himself strong in such qualities as initiative and boldness in searching, can foster these qualities in a student.

The exercise progressed in conditions which were as close as possible to actual combat. One could not give a high enough rating to the exercise director's skill in training methods. But we hear this weighty and obliging phrase rather often. Is it always preceded by a thorough and principled analysis of the content and nature of an exercise? Isn't this phrase degraded by frequent use? It is important for all officers to ask themselves these questions. It is particularly important for us, instructors in military educational institutions.

Naval School Criticized

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov: "When Criticism Is Ignored. Party Life: In Military Faculties at Institutes"]

[Text] It happened at the party meeting of the institute's military faculty to hear reports and elect new officials. The course chief, Captain 1st Rank N. Tyurenkov made critical remarks about the faculty chief, Engineer Captain 1st Rank N. Kora.

It was a question of Communist Kora's relationship to those subordinates who were working on their dissertations. They do not always receive support from the faculty chief. As regards Tyurenkov's work on his doctoral dissertation, Nil Konstantinovich Kora simply does not approve of it. Kora declared in an unofficial conversation roughly the following: "The faculty is not in need of any doctors of sciences. We are not training scientists, but rather, reserve officers." Nor did the dissertation's topic appeal to him: "Why should candidate of sciences Tyurenkov, who teaches about tactics and naval weapons, get carried away with historical problems which do not coincide with the character of the institute and the faculty?" The dissertation's topic is dedicated to studying the combat training activity of one of the fleets during a complex and interesting period of its development and touches on many tactical and technical aspects. These facts, plus the fact that the topic was approved in the navy's scientific research institutions had no influence on the faculty chief's attitude.

What did all this result in for the aspirant? The faculty chief fills out the paperwork for the dissertation rather reluctantly. Quite often, Tyurenkov has to ask several times for a "signature" from the chief, while hearing reproaches such as "In this case you are working only for yourself, the faculty will not concern itself with your dissertation."

Of course, one can't get along without a brief characterization of Communist Tyurenkov, an evaluation of his party qualities and service activity. He is a

trustworthy, competent and industrious officer. His doctoral dissertation work does not hinder him in instructing and educating his students; on the contrary, it helps him do this. Therefore, the insult and perplexity which he shared with his comrades in the party organization and about which he spoke openly and bluntly to Communist Kora, are especially understandable.

And what was the reaction to the criticism? Nil Konstantinovich Kora spoke after Tyurenkov and responded to the criticism with an enigmatic statement: "I have been expecting this for a long time." He declined to be more detailed in his response.

Some time passed and Communist Tyurenkov asked the vaculty's party bureau if his critical remarks were considered as justified and if measures would be taken, based on his speech. Captain 2nd Rank V. Sokolov, secretary of the party bureau, responded: "No measures will be taken. You had no right to criticize the chief. Our party organization does not have the right to monitor the activity of the administration."

Nikolay Aleksandrovich Tyurenkov correctly pointed out that monitoring and criticizing are totally different matters. He also cited the Party Regulations and the Instructions of CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, in which it is written that "communists have the right at party meetings to criticize any member or candidate-member, regardless of his position." This did not help. "You won't change my mind," replied the secretary.

At the next session of the party bureau, the members tried to suggest, very indirectly, to Comrade Tyurenkov that he had, as it were, disregarded "matters of subordination." Nor did he find any support in the institute's party committee, where he was reminded that the military faculty was one of the best in the institute, largely due to its chief.

It was hardly necessary to remind Communist Tyurenkov about this. He is proud of the achievements of his own faculty and has made a personal contribution to these achievements. When he made his critical remarks at the party meeting about a comrade in the party organization, Tyurenkov did not even think about infringing upon Kora's authority or belittling his contributions. On the contrary, he thought that he would call attention to an area where achievements had been fewer than they might have been. He thought that he would help Communist Kora evaluate the management of scholarly research work more thoroughly and self-critically.

The speech might have given impetus to an important discussion. There are only two candidates of sciences on the faculty. They defended their dissertations a rather long time ago. For some aspirants, things are progressing extremely slowly, which, however, doesn't bother anyone much. Nik Konstantinovich Kora himself does not have an academic degree.

Of course, Communist Kora might have his own opinion about the topicality and practical value of the topic of one or another dissertation. He also has the right and duty to evaluate his subordinates' ability to combine scholarly work with educational work. If he does not share Communist Tyurenkov's point of

view and does not agree with his critical remarks, considering them to be unfounded, then why didn't he speak about this at the party meeting? The norms of party life, which require an answer to criticism, were violated. That is why this common episode suddenly acquired significance based on principle. Some communists ask themselves the question: "Is it at all worthwhile to talk about shortcomings and omissions?" That is a strange question. But what can you do when one of the instructors, Reserve Officer G. Kolchin, declares that "We have never had such speeches (referring to Comrade Tyurenkov's speech) at our meetings and we don't need them in the future," or when the secretary of the party bureau, Captain 2nd Rank V. Sokolov, speaks even more categorically: "In this case, criticism touched on matters of subordination. That is not the officer's way of doing things."

The attitude of these and some other comrades is not simply dubious. It is fundamentally incorrect and contradicts the basic norms of intra-party democracy. Only orders and instructions are not discussed and they are certainly not criticized. But as regards the attitudes of a supervisor towards his men, towards their word and service, since when did this topic become forbidden? Can a communist supervisor be removed from the influence of the party organization and falsely defend the honor of his uniform?

Some people here reproach Communist Tyurenkov for "making trouble" and say that his "irregular" speech caused a "disturbance." Some thing he is right, others share the attitude of the party bureau secretary. In fact, ignoring the criticism engendered false rumors. And one must say with all certainty that there is no room for such a situation where the commander's responsibility for both military and political matters is implemented on a strictly party basis, where the responsible commander combines a demanding nature with sensitivity and attentiveness to his men. The commander must correctly understand the role of criticism in the life of the party organization. By his personal adherence to principles, he must foster this quality of criticism among each of his subordinates.

9887

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BORDER GUARDS AND INTERNAL TROOPS

BRIEFS

BORDER GUARD DETAINS SUSPICIOUS DRIVER--The alarm call reached the border: A local inhabitant had seen a suspicious person violating border procedure at the station. The border guards immediately rushed to the station. Lt N. Degtyarev, the post's deputy chief for political affairs, headed the group. All the group members are well matched--strong, skilled, experienced servicemen. But the best one is Lance Corporal N. Dorokhin, a candidate member of the CPSU. The border guards had to work under complex conditions. It was night and rain was falling. That was where the skill of Dorokhin and his comrades was of use. The border guard's trained eye took note of everything of importance: The partly closed car door, the muddy tracks on the gravel. The stranger was apprehended in one of the cars. He tried to get away but Lance Corporal Dorkhin raised his sub-machine gun menacingly. Incidentally, attached to the casing of this weapon is a plate bearing the inscription: "To a valiant border guard and winner in socialist competition. M.T. Kalashnikov." These submachine guns bearing a dedicatory inscription from the renowned Soviet designer are presented to the very best border troops. And one of them has been presented to Lance Corporal Nikolay Dorokhin. [Text] [PM280851 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 82 p 4]

CSO: 1801/244

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

'TASS' VIEWS EFFECTS OF U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING VIETNAM WAR

LD271708 Moscow TASS in English 1533 GMT 27 May 82

[Report by TASS news analyst Leonid Ponamarev: "Victims of American Chemical Warfare"]

[Text] Moscow, 27 May (TASS)--Harmful consequences of the use of chemical weapons by the United States during its war in Indochina still make themselves felt at present. As some people in the United States began to forget that war, it reminded of itself once again--more and more former American soldiers, exposed to poisonous substances which were used in Indochina, are found to be affected by these chemicals. About 60,000 Americans who took part in the Vietnam war, recruited young and healthy, returned home from the war without the slightest suspicion that they are doomed to grave diseases and even early death. All of them were in contact with the so-called Agent Orange which was used by American troops to destroy the Vietnamese forests and crops and contaminate water reservoirs. Immense damage was inflicted on Vietnam and other countries of Indochina as a result of the use of the chemicals by the American troops.

It was pointed out at a press conference of Soviet scientists at the Soviet Foreign Ministry in March this year that the use by the United States of chemical weapons in Vietnam resulted in terrible consequences, affecting more than 1.5 million people. The use of Agent Yellow, containing a highly toxic synthetic substance--diotoxine--brought about especially grave consequences. That agent caused disruption of the hereditary mechanism, cancer of blood and liver. Even today, 10 years after the end of the U.S. chemical war in Vietnam, the traces of American chemical barbarity are seen everywhere in that country.

The Reagan administration, as is known, took a decision to expand the production of advanced types of chemical weapons with a view to boosting preparations for chemical war. The Pentagon's arsenals have already accumulated enough chemical weapons to annihilate umpteen times all living things on earth and inflict irreparable damage to the environment. Nevertheless, Washington leaders took the course towards a further buildup of the chemical weapons potential.

The Pentagon frankly admitted that the arming of the U.S. Army with new poisonous substances, like the binary gas and others, is intended primarily

for having a possibility to wage a large-scale chemical war in Europe. The U.S. preparations for such a war are concealed by trite anti-Soviet insinuations and apparent fabrications. All these inventions are used to justify in the face of the world public Washington's decision to phase into service increasingly more barbaric weapons of mass annihilation, including chemical weapons, and to condition the people to the thought of admissibility of launching a large-scale chemical war.

The Soviet Union, which reiterated that it never used chemical weapons anywhere, consistently and persistently works for the prohibition of chemical means of warfare and destruction of the existing stockpiles of such weapons. The USSR still holds the same position. The United States and its Western NATO allies, however, avoid in all ways a constructive solution of this long overdue problem and continue to build up their arsenals of chemical weapons.

CSO: 1812/108

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' ARTICLE STATES UK IS 'ESCALATING' AGGRESSION IN FALKLANDS

LD301020 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0858 GMT 30 May 82

[Text] Moscow, 30 May (TASS)--In the last few days U.S. military supplies to Britain have been considerably increased and have included modern anti-aircraft and other missiles, mortars and military supplies, writes KRASNAYA ZVEZDA today, commenting on the events connected with the Anglo-Argentine conflict. For example, U.S. Air Force transport planes of the C141 type are carrying out intensive transportation of military cargo directly from the United States to Ascension Island where a U.S. military base is situated. This base is being extensively used by the British command. Just in the past 3 days U.S. planes have delivered about 300 tons of military cargo destined for the British Expeditionary Corps, to the island.

In the opinion of foreign commentators, U.S. aid is helping in a sharp activization of operations by the British landing forces. Apart from this, the paper stresses, the press have started to carry reports of the services being offered to London by the fascist regime in Chile and the racist regime in the RSA. In Chile the assembling of British helicopters is being carried out prior to being sent on to the Falklands/Malvinas. In the ports of the RSA preparations for the maintenance and repair of British ships damaged during the battle are being made.

M. Thatcher's cabinet, in the words of the LONDON TIMES, is stepping up the pace for the seizure of the islands, fearing that fresh casualties during the course of the conflict will sharply alter the mood in the country and undermine the position of the conservatives. Because of this, on a par with the further strengthening of forces in the area of beachheads already seized, the landing of a 3,000-strong British force is expected in the vicinity of Port Stanley to take part in its capture. In this way, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA notes, Britain is undertaking the largest aggressive action in the South Atlantic since the time of the ill-fated Anglo-French military adventure of 1956 in the Suez Canal region.

The paper recalls that in this action Britain is using the experience gained by the British "Tommies," not only during the course of the many national and NATO military exercises but also in the punitive expeditions against the national-liberation forces in its former colonial possessions. As regards the Argentine armed forces, they have practically not fought in the past 100 years which, in the opinion of Western military analysts, cannot but affect their combat capabilities.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

BOOK REVIEW OF HACKETT'S 'THE THIRD WORLD WAR: AUGUST, 1985'

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 10 Mar 82)
p 31

[Article by Col V. Katerinich: "Imperialism Without the Mask: Subversive Actions by the Enemies of Socialism"]

[Text] Highly placed NATO generals, admirals and civilian advisers, headed by British General John Hackett, former CIC of the Northern Army Group of NATO's Joint Armed Forces in Europe, declare, you see, that they know exactly when World War III will begin and they hastened to "please" readers living in bloc countries by presenting them three years ago with the book "The Third World War: August 1985," published by the British publishing house of Macmillan Books. The authors write about it as if the war had just ended. It arose, according to their description, as a conventional war, but immediately developed into a nuclear missile war and concluded with the "destruction of the Soviet Union and its allies," while NATO militarists celebrated victory on the smoldering nuclear ruins of West European cities. Even then the monstrous idea of the possibility and acceptability of nuclear war in Europe and a NATO victory in it began to be dragged out.

But it is not only a matter of this. The book has a fifth chapter which describes events seemingly preceding World War III and which served as the spark which set off the fire. The chapter is called "Unrest in Poland." This, in the authors' words, is what led to weapons being put to use. First demonstrations of "dissatisfied" persons occurred in Gdansk in November 1984, then in other cities "people emerged with flags on which the communist symbols were removed," events took a violent turn and led to war.

Such reasoning by the militarists is no accident. The book's authors did not hold posts where they have to read tea leaves. Their reasoning is taken from plans drawn up in NATO staffs. They clearly and convincingly point to the inseparable link of imperialism's subversive actions against countries of the socialist community with militaristic plans and plans of war against them.

Subversive actions represent a link in the complex of imperialism's military preparations against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. Fresh in everyone's mind are events in Poland of 1980-1981. An attempt was

made there to "loosen up" and subsequently destroy socialism using the mechanism of the so-called "psychological warfare" from without and counterrevolution from within. The goals were not limited only to the PNR [Polish People's Republic], but went further toward weakening the Warsaw Pact organization and creating a military-strategic advantage for NATO and imperialism as a whole.

In revealing these plans and goals the American newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote in late October 1981: "The West is vitally interested in the Polish experiment which, if it is crowned with success . . . may turn into a geopolitical gain for the West."

Various theoretical explorations, manuals and elaborations of late are talking more and more about increasing attempts by imperialist states to take advantage of subversive actions for weakening socialist countries, turning them into an object of continuous pressure on the part of various subversive organizations and thus reducing their defensive potential. This was stated for example in books by American ideologue L. W. Beilenson "Survival and Peace in the Nuclear Era"; by the not unknown P. Nitze "Strategy for the 1980's"; and numerous statements by R. Thompson, British specialist in conducting "psychological operations." All these gentlemen see subversive actions as the chief means for "erosion," "decomposition," "loosening up" and "evolution" of socialist countries in "a direction desirable for the West."

The interweaving of subversive and militaristic actions is clearly seen in their direction from one and the same centers. For example the White House has been and is at the source of subversive actions against the PNR. A "special group for studying the situation and evaluating the national crisis in Poland" and a "working group on Poland" were set up there. The first included Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, CIA Director Casey, and representatives of the White House and U.S. National Security Council. The second was headed by J. Scanlan, a highly placed State Department employee.

A "watch group for Poland" was set up at the Pentagon, this center of world militarism, which included generals and officers maintaining ties with intelligence and propaganda agencies and simultaneously influencing the character of military preparations aimed against socialist countries. As announced in the western press the CIA set up a so-called "Munich Center," which directed and coordinated subversive actions accomplished through radio "Liberty" and "Free Europe," the London "Polish government," the Paris center of Polish emigres and other such organizations. According to data of the PNR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a total of 400 centers were set up supporting activities of political opposition in the country.

Special agencies and centers also were set up in NATO's system of military machinery, which as we know is intended for far from peaceful purposes. The western bourgeois press announced that the NATO Council repeatedly took up the "situation in Poland," as did the permanent consultative committees operating under the Council: on problems of modern society, on political matters, and on information and cultural ties. The headquarters of NATO Joint Armed Forces in Central Europe has a special project department which plans and coordinates psychological operations against socialist states conducted along the military line.

All this graphically indicates that subversive actions do not represent some special, temporary operation against socialist countries conducted by some one or two specially formed organizations of the imperialist states. It is the very policy of imperialist states hostile to socialism, a long-term policy uniting the efforts of all elements of the bourgeois state apparatus and its tools, and in the final account conducted in the interests of aggression. Confirmation of this can be found in the British military-theoretical journal ARMY QUARTERLY, which sounded a call to conduct subversive actions with one of the aspects being "psychological warfare" with strategic goals. This, prophesied the journal, is "economically profitable, promises great dividends and should be used even before a front line of combat actions is apparent."

Having turned subversive actions into a means of struggle against socialist countries and an instrument of preparation for war, the imperialist states and the United States above all are sparing no funds for their preparation and implementation. They make wide use of achievements of scientific-technical thinking for improving and manufacturing new mass media and means of ideological diversions and for expanding the scale and intensity of operations. As stated in a press conference in November 1981 by the chairman of the PNR Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television, "three times more radios broadcast" to Poland "than within the country itself." More than 40 imperialist radio voices in the most varied languages of peoples living in our country broadcast to the Soviet Union. The British radio BBC increased the broadcasting in languages of USSR nations by 20 percent and in the Polish language by more than 20 percent in 1980 alone. In that same year Radio Free Europe increased its broadcasts in the Polish language by 30 percent. The U.S. Congress discussed the possibility of using satellites for stepping up radio and television diversions against socialist countries. British Prime Minister Thatcher stated the intent to unfold even more massive radio propaganda against the USSR.

The content of subversive actions and particularly ideological diversions is being filled with an increasingly ominous, aggressive meaning. Its primary foundation consists of the fabrication of the "Soviet military threat." It is exported by imperialists to all countries of the world and used for implanting hostile antisoviet sentiment, fear and prejudice. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that "fear and prejudice, lies and hatred are the worst enemies of peace. They are what imperialist reaction cultivate in fanning international tension."

The aggressive essence of subversive actions by imperialist states against countries of the socialist community also is seen in the fact that they are bordering more and more on direct intervention in their internal affairs and on attempts to dictate their will and affect specific circles of their population. It stands to reason that such attempts have suffered and will suffer failure but, as the facts indicate, and especially events in Poland, imperialists are continuing to be persistent and resort to increasingly refined methods of introducing their spiritual poison.

By placing reliance on hostile elements the enemies of socialism can do much harm and confuse a certain number of people. It is impossible to ignore this. The forces of peace and progress must use supreme vigilance to counter the subversive actions of imperialism.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

NATO GROUND FORCE NIGHT COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 23 Mar 82) p 25

[Article by Col N. Nikitin: "For Junior Commanders About Armies of NATO Countries: Tanks and Motorized Infantry in Night Combat"]

[Text] The pages of the foreign military press often emphasize that a concentration of forces, the offensive, exploitation of success and defense under night conditions have become conventional kinds of troop combat activities, especially for tank and motorized infantry subunits. For example, the FRG journal TRUPPENPRAXIS notes that the Bundeswehr devotes much attention to coordination of tanks with motorized infantry. In the opinion of ARMY, organ of the U.S. Ground Forces, "movement, offensive, exploitation of success and defense under difficult conditions have become conventional kinds of combat activities."

As a matter of fact, the troops have the most up-to-date equipment. Extensive use is made of electronic means of reconnaissance for organizing and conducting night combat actions: active and passive infrared devices; radars of various types for observing objects and controlling weapons; microwave radiometers; receivers and radio direction finders; laser rangefinders; television, seismic and acoustical equipment; radiometric instruments for detecting targets from natural emission of electromagnetic waves; and instruments which detect people and equipment by a change in the chemical composition of the surrounding air.

Means of signaling and artificial terrain illumination, night vision equipment and radiotechnical means are used to support the night march and combat actions. It is believed that visibility can be increased up to 500-600 m with the use of optics.

For example, U.S. Army subunits use infrared equipment. U.S. Army military specialists assert that by using the IR periscope experienced driver-mechanics can drive tanks at night off the road at a speed of 8-12 km/hr.

It is believed that it is sufficient to have IR instruments on the lead vehicles, several intermediate vehicles and trail vehicles to support column movement at night, but with heavy traffic it is recommended to put out appropriate signal lights and markers along the road ahead of time for night orientation.

U.S. Army subunits have devices which detect targets at night at the following distances: soldiers up to 1,500 m and vehicles up to 8,000 m. The AN/TPS-33 station detects moving ground targets at the following distances: a human at a distance up to 6,500 m and equipment up to 18,000 m.

And so it is clear that scientific-technical achievements have permitted bringing the tactics of night combat actions almost right up to those of combat during the day. Nevertheless, night combat retains specific features. For example, the darkness contributes to attainment of surprise in delivering strikes and in continuity of combat actions, hinders enemy opposition, interferes with the choice of targets for delivery of strikes by weapons, and restricts the opportunities for employing aircraft and helicopters, especially fire support helicopters. Surprise attacks in the darkness have a stronger moral-psychological effect on people than during hours of daylight. In addition, at night it is more difficult to mop up the aftermath of nuclear strikes and maneuver on the battlefield. We also cannot forget about the limited observation, more difficult orientation and target designation, a reduction in the effectiveness of aimed fire, and complications in command and control.

NATO military specialists believe that personnel losses of attacking subunits decrease under nighttime conditions and there is also an increase in the possibility of closing with the enemy undetected and attacking him by surprise, thus achieving an additional psychological advantage over him.

In the opinion of American military specialists, a night attack by subunits may be conducted for the following purposes: exploitation of success achieved during daytime actions; seizure of a favorable line or terrain sector of great importance for the subsequent development of combat actions on a larger scale during the day; avoidance of heavy losses in personnel and combat equipment inasmuch as the darkness permits closing with the enemy undetected and attacking him by surprise; confusing the enemy with respect to the main axis of attack by the main body.

The night attack by subunits may be conducted with or without fire support. In the first instance an attack usually is accomplished against an enemy who is well dug in. In order to confuse the enemy with respect to the beginning of an attack the first fire strikes may be conducted several times until the attack begins. An attack without fire support is carried out only when the factor of surprise is of decisive importance for the outcome of the combat. Here it is believed necessary to plan fire just as in the first instance, but fire support begins only on command of the attacking subunit commander.

At night only one attack objective is designated for the subunit. Subunit maneuver during an attack is limited inasmuch as their control is hindered. Moreover, attempts to attack a target from different directions may lead to uncoordinated actions and even to an exchange of fire among friendly groups.

The following areas and lines are designated for subunits for the purpose of preparation and a planned attack during night combat: assembly area, attack position, line of deployment into platoon columns, probable line of attack and limit of exploitation.

It is believed that the width of subunit attack frontage and depth of missions must be the very same as in a daylight attack. It is not recommended that these norms be reduced and thus compact combat formations. Therefore under night conditions a company attacks with a frontage up to 1,200 m, the platoon up to 400 m and a squad up to 100 m.

Primary preparation of subunits for a night attack are carried out in the assembly area. On arriving in the area the squad commander checks weapons and ammunition and quickly disperses subordinates. Natural cover is used for camouflage and in some cases command slit trenches and shelters are readied.

The methods of attack depend on the nature of enemy actions. If he does not detect the beginning of the attack, motorized infantry on combat vehicles or in skirmish lines advance toward the objective stealthily. On being detected by the enemy the motorized infantry continues the attack, conducting intensive fire. The mission of squad commanders consists of seeing that the combat formation is maintained and fire effect is increased. They must allocate fire correctly. As a rule tanks operate together with the motorized infantry.

Defense at night essentially is conducted just as during the day. Inasmuch as the effect of aimed fire is reduced at night, however, the special preparation of weapons for firing is necessary. In particular, light machineguns register on the end position of battle outposts and mortars are prepared for conducting defensive fire.

Much attention is given to training personnel in NATO armies in night operations as well as in other difficult conditions. In particular, armies of countries in the aggressive NATO bloc set aside from one-third to one-half of all training time for working problems of conducting reconnaissance, making marches, regrouping troops, attacking, exploiting success and retreating at night. This is still further convincing proof of the further aggressive preparations of bloc armies being conducted under cover of profuse talk about the "Soviet military threat." But as emphasized by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress, "talk with us from a position of strength is absolutely without promise." High vigilance and combat readiness--that is what Soviet soldiers are obligated to use to counter the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

WESTERN NUCLEAR STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 82 (signed to press 23 Mar 82)pp 26-27

[Article by Col G. Arzumanov: "Modern Imperialism: Ideology, Politics, Actions: Nuclear Stakes of NATO"]

[Text] A gamble on employing nuclear weapons in a war against the Soviet Union has been the basis of the NATO bloc's doctrine since the very first days this aggressive grouping of capitalist states headed by the United States was formed. Judging from documents which had been highly classified in Washington in the past but which now nevertheless have been made public, the very first strategic NATO plan, known by the English codename "Dropshot," envisaged the combat employment of 300 nuclear bombs against the USSR "from the very beginning." An explanatory note to the plan stated: "It is necessary for mass destruction weapons to be employed at the very earliest stage and in such numbers as to assure a real undermining of Soviet capability to resist."

The authors of the explanatory note wrote further: "Use of a sufficient number of atomic bombs will permit achieving large-scale physical destruction with the use of relatively minor efforts and in a short time period. In addition . . . use of the atomic bombs will engender a situation of chaos and extreme confusion."

A diagram was appended to the "Dropshot" plan which illustrates the very next plans of the Pentagon: Seizure and occupation of all USSR territory by NATO forces and stationing there of the primary military posts and commandants' offices intended for exercising supervision and surveillance over the surviving part of the population and control of it.

The passion of the fathers of NATO's atomic strategy was warmed to a considerable extent by hopes for the Americans' lengthy monopoly of nuclear weapons and NATO military superiority, as well as by calculations that ocean expanses guaranteed invulnerability to the citadel of capitalism.

But we know that events did not develop as NATO planned it at all. The dynamic development of the community of socialist countries, growth of the authority of socialism on the planet, downfall of the colonial system and activeness of the popular masses in the struggle against militarism--all this predetermined a change in the overall balance of social-political forces in favor of socialism. The NATO bloc did not dare unleash a nuclear war in this situation. Moreover, it was forced to take account of the USSR's creation of

its own high-yield nuclear weapons and the brilliant success of Soviet missile building, which permitted founding a new branch of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, which increased the socialist state's defense potential to an enormous extent.

In the 1970's both Washington and NATO staffs were forced to recognize the presence of an approximate balance in the military field between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. A sober evaluation of this fact led directly to a conclusion about the suicidal nature of attempts to unleash nuclear war. This is what placed representatives of the United States and other NATO countries at the common table for serious talks with countries of the socialist community on very important issues concerning nuclear problems.

A major event of the past decade was resolutions of the Helsinki Conference (1975) on security and cooperation in Europe. The resolutions adopted by the heads of European states as well as the United States and Canada confirmed the inviolability of postwar borders which had arisen between countries and laid the groundwork for cooperation in the political, economic and even military spheres and in the spheres of science and culture. Soviet-American treaties and agreements on prevention of nuclear war, on certain measures in limiting offensive kinds of weaponry and on a limitation of antimissile defense systems also were concluded based on realistic principles of equality and equal security. A second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) between the USSR and the United States was signed in 1979. In developing detente and striving for a further reduction in the threat of war, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community concluded a number of important treaties with France and the FRG and made a large number of proposals aimed at preventing nuclear war.

But it turned out that the nuclear strategy of the United States and NATO had not been exhausted at all. At the dawn of the 1980's when a sharp turn occurred in U.S. politics, NATO's gamble on nuclear weapons again crept upward.

The U.S. administration rejected the SALT-2 Treaty and cast doubt on all other Soviet-American agreements on military matters. The intent was openly proclaimed to resort in U.S. foreign policy to the use or threat of use of weapons, including nuclear weapons. In December 1979 the NATO Council approved a plan for stationing new American medium-range missiles in Europe. Plans were recreated in NATO's leadership spheres which provided for the possibility of delivering treacherous surprise nuclear strikes against targets on USSR territory.

Judging from those steps now being taken in leading imperialist states, the United States and NATO are setting the goal for the next few years of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization both as a whole and above all in nuclear weapons.

The United States is accelerating construction of new strategic submarines of the "Ohio" Class, forging ahead on construction of a series of new strategic bombers and new intercontinental ballistic missiles, and working out the space

shuttle system for use for military purposes. Beginning in 1983 plans within the framework of the NATO bloc are to begin deploying some 600 new American nuclear missiles on the territory of the bloc's European countries, which is intended to give the NATO members a superiority of more than 1½ times in nuclear weapons delivery platforms and a twofold superiority in the number of nuclear warheads which can be employed by troops of the aggressive grouping in one launch (or sortie).

Similar measures are being taken in England and France, which have their own nuclear weapons. The British Navy is making new missiles operational for submarines, which will carry six or eight warheads each in place of the present three. France plans to replace the present single-charge reentry vehicles of missiles with nuclear warheads having seven charges. A further build-up in the number of nuclear-powered strategic submarines also is planned.

We can see that the NATO bloc now is making considerable effort to renew and develop its physical base for waging nuclear war and to create favorable conditions for itself for unleashing a surprise nuclear attack. Here is but one example of this. An analysis of the technical specifications of the new American Pershing-2 missiles indicates that if these missiles actually are deployed at the launching positions planned for them in Western Europe, they will be able to reach USSR territory against which the missiles are targeted just a few minutes after launch.

The increase in danger of war caused by the aggressive preparations and particularly by NATO's nuclear gambles is perceived throughout the world and is causing lawful concern in all those who are not without the capacity for sober, realistic thinking. An antimilitaristic movement is growing and anti-American sentiments are developing on this basis in NATO countries, especially in Western Europe, since people are beginning to realize more and more clearly that the atomic maniacs from the Pentagon now are imposing on Europe the role of hostage in U.S. politics and are figuring to unleash a "limited nuclear war" in Europe while they themselves avoid retribution.

Differences on matters of nuclear strategy have been the reason for France's special position in NATO. An unprecedented incident in NATO history occurred in December 1981 when, during a session of supreme leadership entities of the North Atlantic Alliance, the leading one, the Military Planning Committee, was not able to adopt a final document because of Greece's special position. The Greek prime minister stressed his government's intention to suspend fulfillment of its obligations of participating in the NATO military organization and spoke out against the stationing of nuclear weapons on his country's territory.

The political position of a number of small countries of the North Atlantic bloc in the center and the north of Europe creates certain obstacles to NATO's nuclear strategy. For the second year now Holland and Belgium are resisting the American diktat and are not giving consent for stationing new U.S. missiles there. Norway and Denmark are adhering to a policy of foreign troops and nuclear weapons not being deployed on their territory in peacetime.

Nevertheless American imperialism, which is dominant in NATO, for now is finding varied frontal and roundabout ways to impose an aggressive line on the North Atlantic bloc as a whole. A most important role in this matter is played by the coincidence of class interests of the bourgeoisie in NATO countries and the continuing leading position of the United States within the capitalist system in matters of economics, politics and military affairs.

The NATO bloc greets with fierce resistance Soviet proposals to come to an agreement on ceasing nuclear weapons testing and their further production in order to limit and then entirely eliminate stockpiles of nuclear bombs, charges and missile warheads. NATO countries show no interest in proposals by countries of the socialist community on forming nuclearfree zones. There is out-and-out rejection of the Soviet proposal to pledge not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. Dozens of variations of proposals by the socialist countries, united in the Warsaw Pact Organization, concern problems of limiting the danger of nuclear war and have been submitted for examination of the governments of NATO countries, but they do not find a positive response here.

To the contrary, NATO's present policy is making nuclear war more probable. The present-day situation demands high vigilance on the part of Soviet citizens and Army and Navy personnel.

The dreams of NATO members that they will be able to achieve military superiority are of course unrealistic. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev once again gave a reminder of this in a response to a letter from participants of the struggle for peace in Australia: "Countries of socialism have attained military-strategic parity with the world of capitalism. This parity serves as a factor deterring the aspirations of aggressive forces. Calculations to shake this parity are doomed to failure." The party, government and all Soviet citizens will see to it that the physical foundation for assuring reliable national defense is preserved. But along with an objective physical basis, a subjective factor--our supreme vigilance, capacity, and each one's ability and readiness to perform his military duty to the end--is of very great importance for defense potential.

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